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MEDIATION AS REGULATION: EXPANDING STATE GOVERNANCE 






Across the United States, state legislatures are issuing new mediation 
mandates that govern how private parties resolve their disputes. 
Legislatures embed these mediation mandates into specific statutory 
regimes ranging from foreclosure to health care to insurance coverage. 
Rather than leave decisions about ADR design to other state institutions, 
like courts or administrative agencies, legislatures increasingly retain 
that authority and formalize the mediation process with legal 
requirements that regulate parties’ behavior and influence mediation 
outcomes. This Article explains how legislatures wield mediation as a 
regulatory tool in this latest phase of mediation’s institutionalization. It 
argues that statutory mediation mandates should be viewed as a form of 
decentralized governance, a paradigm that reconfigures the relationship 
between public and private spheres of power. Viewing these mandates as 
decentralized governance reveals what can be helpful, and also 
problematic, about formalizing mediation and underscores why 
legislatures must exercise care when designing procedural architecture. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Mediation is a familiar fixture in many American legal institutions but its role 
is changing. When disputants bring their grievances to courts and administrative 
agencies, they are encouraged—often required—to participate in mediation, a 
private and confidential meeting where the disputing parties work together, with a 
neutral third party, to try to resolve their differences.1 In recent years, however, 
legislation requiring mediation, particularly at the state level, has expanded in 
scope and in complexity. State legislatures obligate private parties to mediate 
certain types of disputes, sometimes formalizing the process in statute and 
                                                 
* © 2016 Lydia Nussbaum. Associate Professor of Law and Associate Director of the 
Saltman Center for Conflict Resolution, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of 
Nevada, Las Vegas. I am grateful to Jean Sternlight, Rob Rubinson, Fatma Marouf, Katie 
Loncarich Hennessey, and John Lande for reading and commenting on earlier versions of 
this paper. I also extend my sincere appreciation to the William S. Boyd School of Law for 
supporting my research.  
1 See SARAH R. COLE ET AL., MEDIATION: LAW, POLICY & PRACTICE app. A (2013–
2014 ed. 2013) (cataloguing statutes from all U.S. jurisdictions that contain “mediation” 
and “conciliation”). 
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sometimes requiring mediation before parties may turn to state institutions for 
assistance. As a result, mediation has become a new vehicle for state intervention 
that redraws old boundaries between public and private dispute resolution. 
Statutory mediation mandates fall into two categories. In one, legislators 
embed mediation requirements into statutory regimes, forcing parties to mediate 
when certain substantive legal rights are at stake. For example, in some states, 
patients who believe they are victims of medical malpractice,2 parties that cannot 
agree on terms modifying a beer-distribution contract,3 and nursing mothers 
seeking to enforce their rights under a state Workplace Accommodations Act4 all 
must mediate before they can initiate formal claims. In the second category, 
legislatures not only require mediation, but also control how parties mediate. A 
Maine statute requires lenders and homeowners to attend foreclosure mediation 
and, during the mediation session, complete worksheets to determine the 
homeowner’s eligibility for a loan modification.5 California’s statute mandating 
mediation of insurance coverage disputes prohibits the insurers’ legal counsel from 
attending mediation if the insured party lacks legal representation.6 Both categories 
of mediation statutes constitute legislative regulation of parties’ negotiation 
behavior and an effort to influence dispute resolution outcomes.7 
State statutes that compel mediation or particularize the mediation process 
signal a new phase in mediation’s institutionalization. Ordinarily, federal and state 
legislatures give courts and administrative agencies discretion in designing 
mediation programs and establishing guidelines for parties and mediators. While 
others have written about court-connected mediation programs requiring litigants 
to mediate,8 little attention has been paid to legislatures’ role in mandating 
mediation for private disputes and the regulatory nature of those mandates.9 
                                                 
2 S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-79-125 (Supp. 2015); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.70.100 
(West 2007). 
3 MD. CODE ANN. art. 2B, § 21-103 (West, Westlaw through 2008 Act 2008). 
4 COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-13.5-104(5) (2012). 
5 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6321-A (2014). 
6 CAL. INS. CODE § 10089.80 (West 2013). 
7 The relationship between state authority and informal justice has been explored 
elsewhere. See 1 THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 267–75 
(Richard L. Abel ed., 1982). Abel and the contributors to his edited volumes discuss, often 
with skepticism, the extent to which informal dispute resolution can really exist free of 
state control. Whereas Abel explores the delegalization of formal dispute resolution 
processes, the focus of this Article is on a different phenomenon: state efforts to formalize 
an informal procedure like mediation. Furthermore, the Article concentrates on the 
statutory language itself and does not conduct empirical analysis of whether there are gaps 
between the law on the books and parties’ behavior on the ground.  
8 See, e.g., Nancy A. Welsh, The Place of Court-Connected Mediation in a 
Democratic Justice System, 5 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 117, 138–39 (2004); Douglas 
A. Van Epps, The Impact of Mediation on State Courts, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 
627, 627–34 (2002); Wayne D. Brazil, Should Court-Sponsored ADR Survive?, 21 OHIO 
ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 241, 246–49 (2006); Peter N. Thompson, Good Faith Mediation in 
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Why is a process like mediation, classically characterized by privacy, 
informality, a lack of prefabricated structure, and participant-driven resolution, 
being deployed in such a structured, rule-based way? While no clear legislative 
intent emerges from states deploying mediation as a regulatory tool, one possible 
explanation for this new frontier in state regulation of dispute resolution comes 
from governance theory.  
Governance theory explores the relationship between governments and the 
governed.10 There are many different models for characterizing this relationship; 
for example, a government can be interventionist in its regulatory approach or it 
can be laissez-faire. But a third model of regulatory governance, which some have 
called “decentralized,” “reflexive,” “responsive,” “procedural,” or “libertarian 
paternalism,”11 is particularly relevant to understanding legislative mediation 
mandates. The animating theory behind decentralized governance is that states can 
advance social welfare by restoring some autonomy and decision-making power to 
regulated entities. States effectuate decentralized governance, not by erasing 
regulation altogether (which would be de-regulation), but by constructing new 
processes in which regulated actors must participate. 
This Article argues that statutory mediation mandates should be characterized 
as decentralized governance because it best describes the changing relationship 
between the state and private actors when it comes to dispute resolution. Statutory 
mediation mandates relocate authority over dispute resolution from the state to 
private parties, creating opportunities for disputants to negotiate directly and 
resolve their conflicts without state adjudication yet within procedural parameters 
laid down by the state. Formalizing private parties’ dispute processing through the 
procedural architecture of decentralized governance can promote (more) balanced 
negotiations between parties than might otherwise occur. However, it also has the 
potential to burden parties with additional complexity and, where disputants have 
mismatched negotiation power, place the vulnerable party at a disadvantage. 
Legislatures, therefore, must be purposeful when issuing mediation mandates in 
substantive law and formalizing elements of the mediation process. By recognizing 
the existence of these new state intrusions into the traditionally private sphere of 
                                                 
the Federal Courts, 26 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 363, 378–85 (2011). For a discussion 
of how mediation has been integrated at the federal level, see Jeffrey M. Senger, Turning 
the Ship of State, 2000 J. DISP. RESOL. 79, 79–86 (2000). 
9 With the exception of a 1986 symposium, Proposed Legislation on Critical Issues in 
Mediation, which focused on regulation of mediators and the mediation process (e.g., 
confidentiality, enforceability of mediated agreements, mediator privilege and immunity) 
and a handful of subject-specific articles on environmental dispute resolution or special 
education dispute resolution, the author found no articles that examined the integration of 
mediation into state legislative statutory regimes. Symposium, Proposed Legislation on 
Critical Issues in Mediation, 2 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 121, 121–27 (1986). 
10 See infra Part V.  
11 See infra Part V.C. 
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mediation, legislatures can take care to enhance, rather than erode, fairness and 
justice.  
The Article is organized in six parts. Part II begins by explaining classical 
mediation’s unique characteristics and how it differs from other dispute resolution 
processes like public adjudication and private arbitration. Part III then discusses 
why mediation became “institutionalized” in the American legal system as a tool 
for judicial reform. Part IV explores the latest phase in mediation’s 
institutionalization: substantive statutes with embedded mediation requirements, 
some of which also regulate parties’ behavior and influence mediation outcomes 
by formalizing different dimensions of the mediation process. Part V argues that 
this phenomenon should be understood as decentralized governance. Part VI 
argues that while these statutory mediation mandates may provide private parties 
greater authority over dispute resolution outcomes, formalizing mediation can be 
problematic. It therefore concludes with recommendations to policymakers about 
how to formalize mediation so that it can be beneficial and not harmful to parties. 
 
II.  MEDIATION, CLASSICALLY SPEAKING 
 
Before embarking on a discussion of mediation’s formalization, this Article 
must first clarify: what is mediation? This Part sets out mediation’s core principles 
and identifies the classic characteristics that distinguish it from other dispute 
resolution processes.  
Mediation brings disputing parties together with a third party who helps them 
identify issues of concern, overcome communication barriers, and explore possible 
options for resolving the dispute.12 The mediation process can look very different 
depending on its context. Like the finches Charles Darwin observed inhabiting the 
Galapagos Islands,13 the mediation process adapts to its unique environment,14 the 
                                                 
12 4 AM. JUR. 2D Alternative Dispute Resolution § 6 (2007) (citing GRENIG & DAVIES, 
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION § 2:16). The drafters of the Uniform Mediation Act, 
with input from mediation practitioners and scholars around the country, defined mediation 
as “a process in which a mediator facilitates communication and negotiation between 
parties to assist them in reaching a voluntary agreement regarding their dispute.” NAT’L 
CONF. OF COMM’RS OF UNIF. ST. LAWS, UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 2(1) (2003), 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/mediation/uma_final_03.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/DYX8-8LCV]. 
13 Charles Darwin recorded the tremendous variety of finch species living on the 
Galapagos Islands, each finch having developed unique characteristics that allowed it to 
thrive in its particular island environment. Despite their differences, all of the birds still 
belonged to same family of birds, Thraupidae or tanagers (although this placement in the 
tanager family is a matter of debate). See Kevin J. Burns et al., Phylogenetics and 
Diversification of Tanagers (Passeriformes: Thraupidae), the Largest Radiation of 
Neotropical Songbirds, 75 MOLECULAR PHYLOGENETICS & EVOLUTION 41, 58 (2014). 
14 JAMES J. ALFINI ET AL., MEDIATION THEORY AND PRACTICE (2d ed. 2006) 
(discussing mediation of different kinds of legal and nonlegal disputes); see also David 
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nature of the dispute,15 the parties,16 whether the parties have legal representation,17 
and the mediator.18 Thus, the term “mediation” can denote a range of different 
processes, each operating according to different philosophies about the objectives 
of the process itself and the mediator’s role in furthering those objectives.19 For 
example, mediators debate how a mediator helps disputants resolve conflicts in a 
neutral way20 and whether a mediator should utilize techniques considered 
“facilitative,”21 “transformative,”22 “evaluative,”23 or a combination of these 
different approaches.24 
                                                 
Luban, The Quality of Justice, 66 DENV. U. L. REV. 381, 382–83 (1988) (stating that 
generalizations about ADR prove “loose and imperfect” because there are so many 
varieties). 
15 Ellen A. Waldman, Identifying the Role of Social Norms in Mediation: A Multiple 
Model Approach, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 703, 707–14 (1997) (categorizing mediators’ 
approaches as “norm-generating,” “norm-educating,” or “norm-advocating”); see also 
Lawrence Susskind, Environmental Mediation and the Accountability Problem, 6 VT. L. 
REV. 1, 40–44 (1981) (noting that in disputes over environmental quality or natural 
resources, mediators bear special responsibility to ensure that settlements reached are in the 
public’s interest). 
16 Nancy Ver Steegh, Yes, No, and Maybe: Informed Decision Making about Divorce 
Mediation in the Presence of Domestic Violence, 9 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 145, 
170–73 (2002) (stating that decisions to mediate are highly individualized and depend on 
the particular interests and dynamics of the parties); see also Dean B. Thomson, A 
Disconnect of Supply and Demand: Survey of Forum Members’ Mediation Preferences, 21 
CONSTRUCTION LAW. 17, 20–21 (2001) (pointing out that a survey of the construction 
industry shows that parties prefer a particular style of mediation). 
17 Jean R. Sternlight, Lawyerless Dispute Resolution: Rethinking a Paradigm, 37 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 381, 383 (2010). 
18 James Alfini, Trashing, Bashing and Hashing It Out: Is This the End of “Good 
Mediation”?, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 47, 66–73 (1991) (highlighting interviews with 
different court-connected mediators that demonstrate that their professional backgrounds 
influence their mediation approach; for example, those who are retired judges are most 
likely to “bash” out an agreement between the parties). 
19 Jay Folberg notes that “[f]orms of conflict resolution in which a third party helps 
disputants to resolve their conflicts and reach a decision of their own has probably been 
practiced since there were three people on earth.” Jay Folberg, A Mediation Overview: 
History and Dimensions of Practice, 1983 MEDIATION Q. 3, at 3–4 (1983). 
20 Neutrality in the mediation context is generally taken to mean that the mediator has 
no conflicts of interest or bias toward any party. See UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 9, cmts, supra 
note 12. The mediation community has not reached consensus, however, about how the 
mediator actually assists parties in a neutral way and whether mediators can still be neutral 
while having an agenda of their own, such as the objective to obtain settlement. See, e.g., 
Joseph B. Stulberg, The Theory and Practice of Mediation: A Reply to Professor Susskind, 
6 VT. L. REV. 85, 94–97 (1981) (noting that among many other qualities, a mediator must 
be neutral with regard to outcome because that is how she develops a bond of trust with the 
parties and ensures that parties’ substantive interests are not jeopardized). 
21 Facilitative mediators often see their role as asking questions of the parties, 
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These different species of mediation, however, all share common traits that 
make mediation distinct from other dispute resolution processes: 1) mediation 
employs a horizontal structure; 2) all outcomes require consensus; and 3) 
discussions are confidential.  
First, mediation occurs horizontally, between parties, rather than handed 
down vertically from a third-party decision maker.25 As Lon Fuller wrote, 
mediation’s central quality is  
 
its capacity to reorient the parties toward each other, not by imposing 
rules on them, but by helping them to achieve a new and shared 
perception of their relationship, a perception that will redirect their 
attitudes and dispositions toward one another.26  
                                                 
exploring interests underlying the conflict, and facilitating discussion about how the 
conflict can be resolved. See, e.g., Joseph B. Stulberg, Facilitative Versus Evaluative 
Mediator Orientations: Piercing the “Grid” Lock, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 985, 991–92 
(1997); Kimberlee K. Kovach & Lela P. Love, Mapping Mediation: The Risks of Riskin’s 
Grid, 3 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV 71, 106, 108 (1998). 
22 Transformative mediators focus on improving the quality of communication 
between the parties in dispute and less on how to arrive at settlement. See, e.g., Robert A. 
Baruch Bush, Efficiency and Protection, or Empowerment and Recognition?: The 
Mediator’s Role and Ethical Standards in Mediation, 41 FLA. L. REV. 253, 263–64 (1989).  
23 Evaluative mediators often rely heavily on separate caucus meetings with the 
individual parties in order to help the parties analyze the strengths and weaknesses of their 
legal positions and predict outcomes of court or other processes. See, e.g., Leonard L. 
Riskin, Understanding Mediators’ Orientations, Strategies, and Techniques: A Grid for the 
Perplexed, 1 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 7, 27–28 (1996); James H. Stark, The Ethics of 
Mediation Evaluation: Some Troublesome Questions and Tentative Proposals, from an 
Evaluative Lawyer Mediator, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 769, 796 (2000). 
24 Others have noted that different approaches to the mediator’s role are not mutually 
exclusive and can be combined in sophisticated ways. See, e.g., Leonard L. Riskin, 
Decisionmaking in Mediation: The New Old Grid and the New New Grid System, 79 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 29–49 (2003); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Beyond Formalism and False 
Dichotomies: The Need for Institutionalizing a Flexible Concept of the Mediator’s Role, 24 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 949, 951–54 (1997); Nancy A. Welsh, You’ve Got Your Mother’s 
Laugh: What Bankruptcy Mediation Can Learn from the Her/History of Divorce and Child 
Custody Mediation, 17 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 427, 432–41 (2009). However, a number 
of processes may be labeled mediation when they are in fact more like arbitration or some 
other form of dispute resolution. See, e.g., Julie Heintz, Mediating Instead of “Mediating,” 
75 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 333, 334–35 (1998); Lela P. Love, The Top Ten Reasons Why 
Mediators Should Not Evaluate, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 937, 946–48 (1997). 
25 Robert Yazzie, “Life Comes from It”: Navajo Justice Concepts, 24 N.M. L. REV. 
175, 177–178, 180 (1994) (“Vertical” models of justice rely upon hierarchies and power in 
which a “decision is dictated from on high by the judge” while “horizontal” models of 
justice are based on “equality and the full participation of disputants in a final decision.”).  
26 Lon L. Fuller, Mediation—Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 305, 325 
(1971). The way in which mediators actualize this “reorientation” can vary widely. See 
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A mediator, rather than creating rules by which disputing parties will be bound, 
“induce[s] the mutual trust and understanding that will enable the parties to work 
out their own rules. The creation of rules is a process that cannot itself be rule-
bound . . . .”27 
Second, and relatedly, parties in mediation make their own autonomous 
decisions about whether and how to resolve their dispute. Both parties must 
mutually agree to any terms of agreement, making mediation a “consensual” 
dispute resolution process.28 Like direct party negotiations, classical mediation 
requires consensus for resolution—scholars and practitioners often refer to 
mediation as “problem-solving,” rather than oppositional, because at the end of the 
day the parties need each other to agree to resolution.29  
And third, mediation discussions are confidential.30 Unlike formal hearings, 
the only written record of a classical mediation session consists of a signed 
confidentiality agreement and, if the parties decide to resolve their dispute and 
formalize the resolution in writing, a written agreement. Although practices do 
vary, in the classical vision of mediation, the mediator does not make 
recommendations to entities outside the mediation or report on mediation 
                                                 
supra notes 21–24. For a creative analysis identifying the origins of diverse mediation 
models in legal movements of the twentieth century, see Michal Alberstein, The 
Jurisprudence of Mediation: Between Formalism, Feminism and Identity Conversations, 
11 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 1, 4–18 (2009). 
27 Fuller, supra note 26, at 326. 
28 A “consensual process” is one in which disputants retain the ability to consent to 
ultimate resolution (e.g., fact finding, negotiation, mediation, conciliation) whereas an 
“adjudicatory process” is one in which disputants surrender the power to decide the end 
result to a third-party decision maker (e.g., administrative hearings, arbitration, judicial 
decision making). John S. Murray, Guideposts for an Institutional Framework of 
Consensual Dispute Processing, 1984 J. DISP. RESOL. 45, 48–49 (1984). However, 
processes that are consensus-based in theory may not operate that way in practice. Nancy 
A. Welsh, Making Deals in Court-Connected Mediation: What’s Justice Got to Do with 
It?, 79 WASH. U. L. Q. 787, 846–51 (2001). 
29 See generally Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: 
The Structure of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754 (1984) (contrasting an 
adversarial-individualistic-competitive approach to negotiation with an interest-based, 
problem-solving approach). 
30 COLE ET AL., supra note 1, at app. A. The Uniform Mediation Act attempted to 
inject some uniformity in state laws governing mediation privileges and admissibility of 
mediation. UNIF. MEDIATION ACT §§ 4, 5, 6, 8–12, supra note 12. Parties also contract for 
confidentiality when they sign agreements to mediate, although these contractual 
confidentiality clauses vary in scope and are vulnerable to the same legal challenges as 
other private contracts. 
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discussions in any other forum.31 The hope is that parties will participate candidly 
and without fear of retribution as a result of what is said in mediation.32 Because of 
confidentiality, it is presumed that parties will be more likely to exchange 
information and make disclosures, especially information that goes against their 
self-interest.33 
These core principles of mediation make it distinct from other forms of 
dispute resolution. Compared with adversarial processes like binding arbitration or 
adjudication, in mediation parties do not face a win-lose contest34 and the mediator 
has no authority to render a decision or make binding findings of fact.35 Mediation 
discussions often unfold in an informal, unstructured way, without procedural rules 
about who can speak, what they say, or when and how they say it.36 Unlike 
                                                 
31 Some state laws carve out some public-policy exceptions to confidentiality, for 
example, in cases of child abuse. Art Hinshaw, Mediators as Mandatory Reporters of Child 
Abuse: Preserving Mediation’s Core Values, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 271, 273 (2006). 
32 See, e.g., Maryland’s Mediation Confidentiality Act, MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. 
PROC. § 3-1801 (West 2012). For a discussion of the policy reasons behind confidentiality 
of mediation communications and mediator privilege, see UNIF. MEDIATION ACT, prefatory 
n., supra note 12. 
33 Ellen E. Deason, The Quest for Uniformity in Mediation Confidentiality: Foolish 
Consistency or Crucial Predictability?, 85 MARQ. L. REV. 79, 81–82 (2001) (emphasizing 
that mediation’s goal is to effectuate communication between adversarial parties who do 
not trust each other; confidentiality makes this communication possible by removing the 
threat that disclosures against party self-interest can later be used against them); Lawrence 
R. Freedman & Michael L. Prigoff, Confidentiality in Mediation: The Need for Protection, 
2 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 37, 37–38 (1986) (explaining that confidentiality is a vital 
ingredient to mediation because, among other things, it provides privacy, enables parties to 
be candid about deep-seated feelings, and protects unsophisticated parties). 
34 Robert Rubinson, Client Counseling, Mediation, and Alternative Narratives of 
Dispute Resolution, 10 CLINICAL L. REV. 833, 855–58 (2004) (discussing how litigation 
resolves conflict by identifying one party as the winner in a contest of competing morality 
tales whereas mediation, by framing conflict as a byproduct of normal human conduct 
rather than a “disruption of the moral order,” uses party collaboration to achieve common 
ground and resolve conflict). 
35 LEONARD L. RISKIN ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS 15 (3d ed. 2005). 
Often, in the context of the courts, the purpose of the mediation and the role of the 
mediator are outlined as assisting parties with communication. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 
44.403(4) (West 2004) (“The mediator’s role is to reduce obstacles to communication, 
assist in identifying issues, explore alternatives, and otherwise facilitate voluntary 
agreements to resolve disputes, without prescribing what the resolution must be.”). But see 
Jacqueline Nolan-Haley, Mediation: The “New Arbitration,” 17 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 61, 
86 n.128 (2012) (explaining how “med-arb” is a hybrid process that begins as mediation 
and, should any issues not be resolved successfully by the parties themselves, ends with the 
neutral third party deciding the matter). 
36 There may be unspoken rules about mediation procedure, for example asking the 
complainant to open the discussion, but these are not formalized in law like other 
procedures that govern the order of closing statements (FED. R. CRIM. P. 29.1), witness 
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arbitration, where an arbitrator issues a decision that may or may not be binding on 
the parties, mediation gives parties and their representatives space to decide what 
arrangements make the most sense for their situation and create tailor-made 
solutions; thus, even with similar facts and the same legal standards, mediation 
outcomes can be different.37 Moreover, unlike settlement conferences or early 
neutral evaluation, there need not be a court case for parties to mediate.38 Thus, 
what defines mediation is its informality and adaptability, and it is these qualities 
that led to its institutionalization.  
 
III.  MEDIATION BECOMES INSTITUTIONALIZED 
 
Mediation has become an integral part of the American legal system over the 
past 30 years.39 Once limited to collective bargaining40 and divorce,41 mediation 
                                                 
examination (FED. R. EVID. 611) or courtroom behavior (MISS. UNIF. R. P. JUST. CT. 1.18 
(prohibiting behavior intended to irritate or annoy, requiring attorneys and parties to refrain 
from making “quips,” etc.)). Formal rules are not the bailiwick of courts alone, but also 
extend to private dispute resolution processes like arbitration. See American Arbitration 
Association Rules of Procedure, to which parties agree by contract. American Arbitration 
Association, www.adr.org [https://perma.cc/98Y2-HM2Q]. 
37 Some have compared mediation’s capacity for “individualized justice” to the equity 
courts of yore. See Thomas O. Main, ADR: The New Equity, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 329, 329 
(2005) (noting ADR can fill in for individualized justice and procedural flexibility, 
components currently missing from our contemporary civil justice system); Jacqueline M. 
Nolan-Haley, The Merger of Law and Mediation: Lessons from Equity Jurisprudence and 
Roscoe Pound, 6 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 57, 58 n.14 (2004) (citing Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary Culture: A Tale of Innovation Co-Opted or 
“The Law of ADR,” 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 3 (1991)); Julie Macfarlane, Culture 
Change? A Tale of Two Cities and Mandatory Court-Connected Mediation, 2002 J. DISP. 
RESOL. 241, 244, 245–46 (2002). 
38 Both settlement conferences and early neutral evaluation, commonly used for civil 
cases in state and federal courts, utilize judges, magistrate judges, or attorneys, to serve as a 
third-party neutral who evaluates strengths and weaknesses of parties’ legal positions and 
explores obstacles to settlement. Some early neutral evaluators will also issue a nonbinding 
appraisal of the case’s merits. The ABCs of ADR: A Dispute Resolution Glossary, 13 
ALTERNATIVES HIGH COST LITIG. 147, 149–50 (1995). 
39 Court-connected mediation exists in all fifty states and the federal government. 
Court ADR Across the U.S., RSI’S COURT ADR RESOURCE CENTER (Jan. 25, 2016, 6:54 
PM), http://courtadr.org/court-adr-across-the-us/ [https://perma.cc/EH98-99NV]; 
Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, 28 U.S.C. §§ 651–58 (2012). See also 
Deborah R. Hensler, Our Courts, Ourselves: How the Alternative Dispute Resolution 
Movement Is Re-Shaping Our Legal System, 108 PENN. ST. L. REV. 165, 185–88 (2003); 
GOOGLE NGRAM VIEWER, https://books.google.com/ngrams [https://perma.cc/N9A4-
BAE4] (type “mediation” into the graph-phrase query; then enter “1800” and “2010” in the 
time span fields; then use the cursor to hover over the graph until the year 1975 is visible) 
(displaying a Google Ngram chart tracking the use of the word “mediation” between 1800 
and 2010 that shows the steepest increase starting in 1975 and leveling out in 2003). 
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now has widespread application in a range of disputes: small claims,42 family,43 
business,44 probate,45 guardianship,46 personal injury,47 medical malpractice,48 
                                                 
40 The federal government created the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service in 
1947 to “aid and encourage employers and the representatives of their employees to reach 
and maintain agreements concerning rates of pay, hours, and working conditions.” 29 
U.S.C. § 171 (2012). States also established their own public agencies to assist with 
mediating labor disputes. E.g., 24 PA. CONS. STAT. § 11-1121-A; Public Employee 
Relation Act of 1970, 43 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1101.101 (2009). 
41 California first began using court-connected “conciliation” services in 1939 
primarily as a means to keep married couples together through reconciliation rather than to 
help them divorce. Jay Folberg, Ann L. Milne & Peter Salem, The Evolution of Divorce 
and Family Mediation, in DIVORCE AND FAMILY MEDIATION: MODELS, TECHNIQUES, AND 
APPLICATIONS 4–7 (Jay Folberg, Ann L. Milne & Peter Salem eds., 2004). 
42 E.g., Susan E. Raitt et al., The Use of Mediation in Small Claims Courts, 9 OHIO 
ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 55, 56 (1993). 
43 Mediation is used for matters involving child custody, divorce finances, child 
dependency, and postadoption contact arrangements. See, e.g., ANDREW I. SCHEPARD, 
CHILDREN, COURTS, AND CUSTODY: INTERDISCIPLINARY MODELS FOR DIVORCING 
FAMILIES 54–62 (2004); Kelly Browe Olson, Lessons Learned from a Child Protection 
Mediation Program: If at First You Succeed and Then You Don’t..., 41 FAM. CT. REV. 480, 
480–81 (2003); Jana B. Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1443, 
1498–1507 (1992). 
44 See, e.g., Thomas J. Stipanowich & J. Ryan Lamare, Living with ADR: Evolving 
Perceptions and Use of Mediation, Arbitration, and Conflict Management in Fortune 1000 
Corporations, 19 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 18–19, 44–51 (2014); Craig A. McEwen, 
Managing Corporate Disputing: Overcoming Barriers to the Effective Use of Mediation 
for Reducing the Cost and Time of Litigation, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 4–6 
(1998). 
45 Lela Porter Love, Mediation of Probate Matters: Leaving a Valuable Legacy, 1 
PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 255, 256 (2001) (citing Susan N. Gary, Mediation and the Elderly: 
Using Mediation to Resolve Probate Disputes over Guardianship and Inheritance, 32 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 397, 423–31 (1997)) (explaining that mediation, unlike litigation, 
maintains privacy in probate disputes and creates opportunities for family reconciliation). 
46 See, e.g., Mary F. Radford, Is the Use of Mediation Appropriate in Adult 
Guardianship Cases?, 31 STETSON L. REV. 611, 616–21 (2002); Erica F. Wood, Dispute 
Resolution and Dementia: Seeking Solutions, 35 GA. L. REV. 785, 805–08 (2001). 
47 Personal injury cases comprised 69% of civil cases from one study of court-
annexed mediation in Ohio, the overwhelming majority involving automobile accidents. 
Roselle L. Wissler, Court-Connected Mediation in General Civil Cases: What We Know 
from Empirical Research, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 641, 652–53 (2002). For a 
discussion of mediation in the mass torts context, see Deborah R. Hensler, A Glass Half 
Full, a Glass Half Empty: The Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution in Mass Personal 
Injury Litigation, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1587, 1619–26 (1995). 
48 Proponents of mediating medical negligence cases attest that mediation can repair 
dysfunctional communication between patients (or patient families) and health care 
providers, as well as improve patient safety. Eric Galton, Mediation of Medical Negligence 
Claims, 28 CAP. U. L. REV. 321, 321–24 (2000); Chris Stern Hyman, Mediation and 
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labor and employment,49 education,50 bioethics,51 environmental,52 community,53 
and in criminal cases.54 Now mediation is connected with state and federal courts 
                                                 
Medical Malpractice: Why Plaintiffs, Hospitals and Physicians Should Be at the Table, 66 
DISP. RESOL. J. 32, 32–33 (2011); Carol B. Liebman, Medical Malpractice Mediation: 
Benefits Gained, Opportunities Lost, 74 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 135, 136 (2011). Others 
suggest that face-to-face, interest-based discussions in mediation are the exception, not the 
rule. See Sheila M. Johnson, A Medical Malpractice Litigator Proposes Mediation, 52 
DISP. RESOL. J. 42, 45–46 (1997) (noting that what states like Wisconsin call “mediation” 
is instead a prescreening or evaluation process, designed to weed out claims without legal 
merit); Tamara Relis, Consequences of Power, 12 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 445, 446 (2007). 
For example, some critics point to the incentives that make doctors disinclined to settle 
claims. Haavi Morreim, Malpractice, Mediation, and Moral Hazard: The Virtues of 
Dodging the Data Bank, 27 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 109, 111–13 (2012). 
49 See, e.g., Lisa Blomgren Bingham, Mediation at Work: Transforming Workplace 
Conflict at the United States Postal Service, in TRANSFORMATIVE MEDIATION: A 
SOURCEBOOK, RESOURCES FOR CONFLICT INTERVENTION PRACTITIONERS AND PROGRAMS 
321 (Joseph P. Folger et al. eds., 2010); Deborah A. Schmedemann, Reconciling 
Differences: The Theory and Law of Mediating Labor Grievances, 9 INDUS. REL. L. J. 523, 
525 (1987); Jean R. Sternlight, In Search of the Best Procedure for Enforcing Employment 
Discrimination Laws: A Comparative Analysis, 78 TUL. L. REV. 1401, 1405–06 (2004); 
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The NLRA’s Legacy: Collective or Individual Dispute Resolution 
or Not?, 26 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 249, 249 (2011). 
50 Under the federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), states must 
provide procedures like mediation to address and resolve complaints involving a child’s 
individualized education plan. 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (2012); Nancy A. Welsh, Stepping Back 
Through the Looking Glass: Real Conversations with Real Disputants About 
Institutionalized Mediation and Its Value, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 573, 612–19 
(2004). For a discussion of peer mediation in schools, see Nancy A. Burrell, Cindy S. 
Zirbel & Mike Allen, Evaluating Peer Mediation Outcomes in Educational Settings: A 
Meta-Analytic Review, 21 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 7, 7–8 (2003). 
51 See generally NANCY NEVELOFF DUBLER & CAROL B. LIEBMAN, BIOETHICS 
MEDIATION: A GUIDE TO SHAPING SHARED SOLUTIONS xiii–xiv (rev. and expanded ed., 
2004) (arguing mediation can be a forum for physicians, patients, and families to 
communicate and together make decisions about life and death). 
52 See generally LAWRENCE S. BACOW & MICHAEL WHEELER, ENVIRONMENTAL 
DISPUTE RESOLUTION (1984). For a case study of mediation as public policy, see Janet C. 
Neuman, Run, River, Run: Mediation of a Water-Rights Dispute Keeps Fish and Farmers 
Happy—For a Time, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 259, 259–61 (1996). 
53 See Sally Engle Merry & Neal Milner, Introduction to THE POSSIBILITY OF 
POPULAR JUSTICE: A CASE STUDY OF COMMUNITY MEDIATION IN THE UNITED STATES 4 
(Sally Engle Merry & Neal Milner eds., 1993). Community mediation centers often address 
disputes early, before court intervention, or disputes that, for whatever reason, do not fall 
within the jurisdiction of the courts or public agencies. See, e.g., Clark Freshman, 
Privatizing Same-Sex “Marriage” Through Alternative Dispute Resolution: Community-
Enhancing Versus Community-Enabling Mediation, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1687, 1689–91 
(1997). 
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and at both trial and appellate levels. Mediation is also used by many 
administrative agencies in their quasi-judicial55 and quasi-legislative rule-making 
activities.56 And in the private sector, businesses now include mediation clauses in 
contracts with each other, with their customers, and with their employees, in case 
future disputes arise.57 
The “institutionalization” of mediation, a term used to describe how public 
and private entities have adopted mediation as a standard and legitimate process 
for resolving disputes,58 has historic origins in court reform. To appreciate the 
growth of mediation, especially its emergence as substance-specific procedure in 
state legislation, this Article must go back to the judicial reform movement in the 
last quarter of the twentieth century. The first section of this Part briefly explains 
the perceived shortcomings with judicial dispute resolution that reformers sought 
to repair with alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”). The second section then 
focuses specifically on mediation and the arguments that drove its 
institutionalization: improved efficiency and quality of justice. 
                                                 
54 See, e.g., Mark S. Umbreit, Robert B. Coates & Betty Vos, Victim-Offender 
Mediation: Three Decades of Practice and Research, 22 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 279, 279 
(2004) (describing victim-offender mediation process as “interested victims of primarily 
property crimes and minor assaults . . . meet the juvenile or adult offender, in a safe and 
structured setting, with the goal of holding the offender directly accountable for his or her 
behavior”); Jennifer Gerarda Brown, The Use of Mediation to Resolve Criminal Cases: A 
Procedural Critique, 43 EMORY L.J. 1247, 1248–49 (1994) (noting that victim-offender 
mediation (VOM) “transforms the criminal justice paradigm by placing victims at the 
center, rather than on the periphery, of the criminal process. In effect, VOM transfers the 
power to resolve all or part of a criminal case from the state to a private party—the 
victim.”). 
55 See, e.g., TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2260.052 (West 2008) (mandating rule-making 
agencies in state government to develop negotiation and mediation rules). 
56 This takes the form of negotiated rule-making or “neg-reg” (see, e.g., CAL. PUB. 
RES. CODE §§ 21168.5, 21168.6 (West 1995)). In 1990, the federal government passed the 
Negotiated Rulemaking Act, which permitted agencies to engage a third-party neutral to 
facilitate rule development, and the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act, which 
encouraged administrative agencies to use mediation for interagency or agency-public 
controversies. ALFINI ET AL., supra note 14, at 29–30. 
57 Stipanowich & Lamare, supra note 44, at 18–22. 
58 Some consider institutionalized mediation only as court-connected mediation 
requiring parties to mediate prior to a formal court hearing. E.g., Bobbi McAdoo, Nancy A. 
Welsh & Roselle L. Wissler, Institutionalization: What Do Empirical Studies Tell Us About 
Court Mediation?, 9 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 8, 8 (2003). Others expand the definition of 
institutionalized mediation to include mediation that takes place in, or is connected to, all 
public institutions including courts, administrative agencies, and public schools. E.g., 
Nancy A. Welsh & Peter T. Coleman, Institutionalized Conflict Resolution: Have We 
Come to Expect Too Little?, 18 NEGOT. J. 345, 346 (2002). This Article prefers the 
broadest conception of institutionalization, which is when any entity adopts mediation “as a 
part of doing business.” Sharon Press, Institutionalization: Savior or Saboteur of 
Mediation?, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 903, 904 (1997). 
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A.  Responding to Popular Dissatisfaction with the Courts 
 
The history of mediation’s institutionalization begins with the modern59 
American judicial reform movement of the mid-1970s and early 1980s.60 During 
this judicial reform period, jurists and legal scholars sought to improve delivery of 
just settlements and to rehabilitate the popular legitimacy of courts61 through the 
use of alternative methods of dispute resolution.62 The goals of the judicial reform 
movement were to employ new approaches to dispute processing, so-called 
“process pluralism,” in order to relieve pressure on congested courts by reducing 
delay and eradicating unnecessary costs; involving communities in dispute 
                                                 
59 Earlier efforts to reform the American judicial system took place during the 
Progressive Era of the 1880s to 1920s. During this period, much like their successors in the 
1970s, reformers argued that legal formalism was responsible for court congestion and 
procedural delays and looked to less formal processes like arbitration as a solution. Roscoe 
Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 29 ANN. 
REP. A.B.A. 395, 397 (1906). 
60 Professor Frank Sander refers to this time of experimentation in forms of ADR as 
“Let a thousand flowers bloom,” Frank E.A. Sander, The Future of ADR, 2000 J. DISP. 
RESOL. 3, 3–4 (2000), perhaps alluding to Mao Zedong’s “Hundred Flowers Campaign,” a 
brief period of intellectual and artistic liberalization by China’s Communist Party in 1956. 
JUNG CHANG, WILD SWANS: THREE DAUGHTERS OF CHINA 211–12 (1991). Some identify 
the beginning of the modern ADR movement with the 1976 “National Conference on the 
Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice,” also called the 
Pound Conference. Warren E. Burger, Chief Justice of the U.S., Agenda for 2000 A.D. – 
Need for Systematic Anticipation, Keynote Address at the National Conference on the 
Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice (Apr. 7, 1976), in 15 
JUDGES J. 27 (1976); THE POUND CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE 
(A. Leo Levine & Russell R. Wheeler eds., 1979); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reflections on 
Judicial ADR and the Multi-Door Courthouse at Twenty: Fait Accompli, Failed Overture, 
or Fledgling Adulthood?, 11 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 297, 309 (1996). 
61 CHRISTINE B. HARRINGTON, SHADOW JUSTICE: THE IDEOLOGY AND 
INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF ALTERNATIVES TO COURT 9–10 (1985). Some members of the 
judiciary thought the adversarial process had gone too far, causing erosion of important 
societal values like truth and justice. See, e.g., Dorothy W. Nelson, Alternative Dispute 
Resolution: A Supermart for Law Reform, 14 N.M. L. REV. 467, 468 (1984) (quoting Chief 
Justice Warren Burger as saying the use of adversarial processes as the primary means of 
resolving disputes is “a mistake that must be corrected . . . . For some disputes, trials will 
be the only means, but for many claims, trials by adversarial contest must in time go the 
way of the ancient trial by battle and blood. Our system is too costly, too painful, too 
destructive, too inefficient for a truly civilized people.”). 
62 Frank E.A. Sander, Alternative Methods of Dispute Resolution: An Overview, 37 U. 
FLA. L. REV. 1, 1 (1985) (explaining that the term “alternative dispute resolution 
mechanisms” refers to methods of dispute settlement that are “alternatives” to, not a 
replacement of, court adjudication). 
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settlement processes; enabling more people to access justice; and making dispute 
resolution more effective.63 
Some judicial reformers advocated delegalizing formal judicial procedures 
and creating “multi-door courthouses”64 and “community courts”65 that could offer 
a range of dispute settlement processes and allow for better quality of justice 
depending on the nature of the dispute and the needs of the parties.66 Others sought 
to capture disputes that never made it to the courts67 and instead channel them to 
informal and nonadversarial community-based settings such as Neighborhood 
Justice Centers.68 Both sets of reformers focused on mediation as an alternative 
method for dispute resolution,69 the former group seeking to incorporate mediation 
                                                 
63 Seth Hufstedler & Paul Nejelski, A.B.A Action Commission Challenges Litigation 
Cost and Delay, 66 A.B.A. J. 965, 965–69 (1980); Sander, supra note 62, at 3. See 
generally Robert A. Baruch Bush, Dispute Resolution Alternatives and the Goals of Civil 
Justice: Jurisdictional Principles for Process Choice, 1984 WISC. L. REV. 893, 895–907 
(1984) (providing an excellent contemporary discussion of, and literature review 
presenting, the different views on judicial reform). 
64 Frank E.A. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Resolution, Address at the National 
Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice 
(Apr. 7–9, 1976), in 70 F.R.D. 79 (1976), at 111. 
65 John C. Cratsley, Community Courts: Offering Alternative Dispute Resolution 
Within the Judicial System, 3 VT. L. REV. 1, 2–19 (1978). 
66 HARRINGTON, supra note 61, at 15. 
67 Researchers in the 1970s asked why so many individuals who suffered harm either 
never perceived their injury or never pursued remedies by bringing grievances to courts, a 
phenomenon they termed “grievance apathy” and identified as a complicating problem for 
access to justice reformers. William L.F. Felstiner, Richard L. Abel & Austin Sarat, The 
Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming…, 15 L. & SOC’Y 
REV. 631, 633–37 (1980). 
68 HARRINGTON, supra note 61, at 29–31; Kimberlee K. Kovach, Privatization of 
Dispute Resolution: In the Spirit of Pound, but Mission Incomplete: Lessons Learned and a 
Possible Blueprint for the Future, 48 S. TEXAS L. REV. 1003, 1010–11 (2007); Raymond 
Shonholtz, Justice from Another Perspective: The Ideology and Developmental History of 
the Community Boards Program, in THE POSSIBILITY OF POPULAR JUSTICE, supra note 53, 
at 202. Critics, particularly from the political left, argued that Neighborhood Justice 
Centers were an extension of state power, not an exercise of popular justice at all. Richard 
L. Abel, Expanding State Control, in POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE, supra note 7 
(arguing that informal justice merely disguises state coercion by removing traditional 
symbols of state prosecution—the male judge, the raised dais, the robes and security 
personnel); RICHARD HOFRICHTER, NEIGHBORHOOD JUSTICE IN CAPITALIST SOCIETY: THE 
EXPANSION OF THE INFORMAL STATE 3 (1987). 
69 Although mediation proved popular among reformers of this period, other ADR 
processes like arbitration, early neutral evaluation, and summary jury trials were also 
promoted. Kovach, supra note 68, at 1007. Sociologist Roger Cotterell aptly characterizes 
efforts to make legal remedies more accessible to more people as “less concerned with 
increasing citizen access to existing legal institutions than with the possibility of changing 
legal institutions to bring them closer to citizens.” ROGER COTTERELL, THE SOCIOLOGY OF 
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into courts and the latter seeking to establish dispute settlement programs that, 
though external to courts, were complementary to the judicial system.70 
 
B.  Delivering Quality Resolution Faster 
 
Legislatures, courts, and administrative agencies incorporated mediation into 
public institutions at a time when reformers sought to make the state’s dispute 
processing more accessible, efficient, effective, and just. Mediation’s ability to 
provide an informal, consensus-based process, with a neutral third-party facilitator, 
made it popular among reformers. Those advocating for mediation to advance 
judicial reform goals relied on two primary arguments, often referred to in the 
literature as “the production argument” and “the quality argument.”71 
 
1.  The Production Argument 
 
The production argument posited that ADR processes like mediation would 
be less costly and more efficient than litigation. A perceived “explosion” of 
litigation was believed to clog courts and render “legal justice . . . costly, slow, and 
as a result, inaccessible.”72 Reformers theorized that by providing disputants with 
alternative avenues to settlement, like mediation, courts could help parties resolve 
disputes without lengthy discovery, litigation costs, and time spent attending court 
hearings.73 And, presumably, since parties in mediation reached mutual agreement 
                                                 
LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 291–92 (2d ed., 1992) (noting that the informalism movement, 
which sought to provide access to inexpensive “popular justice,” also coincided with the 
distinct delegalization movement, which emphasized mediation and negotiation in dispute 
processing rather than relying on formal rules and procedures). 
70 Richard Danzig, Toward the Creation of a Complementary, Decentralized System 
of Criminal Justice, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1, 7–9 (1973). See also Robert A. Baruch Bush, 
Staying in Orbit, or Breaking Free: The Relationship of Mediation to the Courts over Four 
Decades, 84 N.D. L. REV. 705, 705–09 (2008) (providing an insightful discussion of the 
relationship between mediation and the courts since the 1960s). 
71 Marc Galanter, “. . . A Settlement Judge, not a Trial Judge:” Judicial Mediation in 
the United States, 12 J. L. & SOC’Y 1, 8 (1985). 
72 Austin Sarat, The Litigation Explosion, Access to Justice, and Court Reform: 
Examining the Critical Assumptions, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 319, 321–22 (1985). It is 
important to note that scholars like Austin Sarat and Marc Galanter questioned the 
assumption that American society had become so unreasonably litigious as to cause a 
“litigation explosion” requiring court reform. They instead suggested that the volume of 
court cases served as a measure of judicial involvement in society’s dispute resolution. Id. 
at 329; Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don’t 
Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 
UCLA L. REV. 4, 10–11 (1983). 
73 See, e.g., Joan B. Kelly, Is Mediation Less Expensive? Comparison of Mediated 
and Adversarial Divorce Costs, 8 MEDIATION Q. 15, 20–21 (1990) (describing a study of 
Northern California divorce cases for which the average cost of adjudication for a 
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on how to settle the dispute, they would be more likely to comply with the terms of 
their agreement, thus reducing costs associated with enforcement claims or 
appeals. Some contemporary evaluations of mediation programs supported the 
efficiency assertions made by judicial reformers. For example, a 1977 study of 
mediated and nonmediated small claims cases in six district courts in Maine found 
that within six to eight weeks following resolution, 72.8% of mediated outcomes 
resulted in full compliance and 10.5% in noncompliance, whereas only 35% of 
adjudicated outcomes resulted in full compliance and almost half in 
noncompliance.74 Furthermore, reformers believed that, with more cases resolved 
in mediation, the administrative and personnel costs for courts, and assumedly the 
burden on taxpayers, would also likely be reduced. A 1981 study of contested 
child-custody cases in Denver found reductions in public sector costs (between 
$5,610 and $27,510 per 100 cases) by processing cases with mediation instead of 
an adversarial process.75 
                                                 
divorcing couple was higher ($12,226) than the cost of a “comprehensive” mediation that 
included attorney consultation ($5,234)); Robert F. Peckham, A Judicial Response to the 
Cost of Litigation: Case Management, Two-Stage Discovery Planning and Alternative 
Dispute Resolution, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 253, 265, 267–69 (1985) (“Justice is becoming 
ever more inaccessible to the poor and middle class; the disparity of resources between 
parties in a case is often determinative of its outcome.”). See also Frank E.A. Sander, 
Varieties of Dispute Processing, in THE POUND CONFERENCE, supra note 60, at 66–68, 72–
79; Sander, supra note 62, at 3; Luban, supra note 14, at 401. 
74 Craig A. McEwen & Richard J. Maiman, Mediation in Small Claims Court: 
Achieving Compliance Through Consent, 18 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 11, 16, 21 (1984). Cf. 
Jessica Pearson & Nancy Thoennes, Divorce Mediation: An Overview of Research Results, 
19 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 451, 470–71 (1985) (citing contradictory results in two 
studies of divorcing couples who resolved their disputes either through mediation or the 
adversarial system, noting that “while mediation may not always be more effective than 
adjudication in preventing relitigation, it certainly does not produce a rash of such 
activity”). 
75 Jessica Pearson & Nancy Thoennes, The Benefits Outweigh the Costs, FAM. 
ADVOC., Winter 1982, at 28. Cost savings to the public have also been supported by some 
more recent assessments. JUD. COUNCIL OF CAL., ADMIN. OFF. OF THE CTS., EVALUATION 
OF THE EARLY MEDIATION PILOT PROGRAMS xxi–xxii (2004), http://www.courts.ca.gov/ 
documents/empprept.pdf [https://perma.cc/CM8T-TBA5] (discussing a 2004 survey of 
California early-mediation programs that found programs reduced the courts’ workload by 
dropping demand for judges’ time for hearing motions and other pretrial court events; and 
the total potential savings ranged from $1.4 million/year (San Diego), to $400,000/year 
(Los Angeles), and $9,700 (Sonoma), with savings in other jurisdictions offset by increases 
in case management conferences); TERESA G. CAMPBELL & SHARON L. PIZZUTI, 
COURTLAND CONSULTING, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CASE EVALUATION AND MEDIATION IN 
MICHIGAN CIRCUIT COURTS 29–31 (2011) (discussing a study of both mediation and early 
case evaluation for civil cases in Michigan that showed that mediation generally reduces 
costs to the court (saving expense associated with trials, but still proving time-consuming 
for court staff to manage) and that mediation, while initially a more expensive option for 
litigants, ultimately reduced overall costs). 
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Mediation could aid the reform goal of efficiency by providing a helpful 
structure for settlement negotiations.76 In contrast to direct party negotiations that 
occur in fits and starts, the mediation process injects a sense of decorum by 
creating a meeting time and place for the parties to sit down together,77 often 
sharing the same meeting space and table.78 Mediation advocates observed that, 
with the structure mediation imposes on negotiations, negotiations can become less 
adversarial, false assumptions can be corrected, and unreasonable demands (from 
clients and opposing parties) can be checked by mediators asking questions and 
clarifying meaning.79 Mediation could thus overcome informational barriers by 
enabling direct, confidential communication among parties and their lawyers.80 
 
2.  The Quality Argument 
 
The second argument made for institutionalizing mediation, the “quality 
argument,” reasoned that mediation yielded better outcomes than litigation by 
empowering parties in the process. Mediation, as a consensual process, could give 
parties control over how their conflicts would be resolved. Putting parties in a 
position to develop their own resolution could yield customized outcomes that 
responded to their specific needs. Indeed, parties in mediation might develop 
                                                 
76 Indeed, mediation is often called “assisted” negotiation. See, e.g., Robert M. 
Ackerman, Disputing Together: Conflict Resolution and the Search for Community, 18 
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 27, 71 (2002). Because most disputes are resolved not by 
judge- or jury-rendered decisions, but instead through settlement negotiations, many 
thought that improving out-of-court negotiations would also reduce reliance on courts. 
Thus, on the one hand, advocates for reform perceived mediation’s value, relative to 
adjudication, as its informal and less-structured procedure while, on the other hand, they 
saw mediation’s value relative to direct party negotiations as the imposition of formality 
and structure. Robert A. Baruch Bush, “What Do We Need a Mediator For?”: Mediation’s 
“Value-Added” for Negotiators, 12 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 5–6 (1996). Cf. Luban, 
supra note 14, at 396 (affirming that the mere presence of a neutral party who has the 
power, even if never exercised, to influence negotiation puts ADR into an entirely different 
system than unmediated negotiation). 
77 Craig A. McEwan, Nancy H. Rogers & Richard J. Maiman, Bring in the Lawyers: 
Challenging the Dominant Approaches to Ensuring Fairness in Divorce Mediation, 79 
MINN. L. REV. 1317, 1369–70 (1995). It is important not to overlook the mundane—a 
scheduled mediation creates a time and a place for negotiation, which has the potential to 
help busy attorneys focus and prepare more thoroughly than ad hoc conversations with the 
other side. Id. at 1387. 
78 This is not always the case. In some forms of mediation—for example, in high-
conflict family cases—the mediator never brings the disputing parties together and instead 
relies on shuttle diplomacy to facilitate negotiations. 
79 McEwan et al., supra note 77, at 1367–68, 1370–71, 1379. 
80 Bush, supra note 76, at 12–15. 
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creative remedies that courts did not have the power to provide.81 Engaging and 
including parties in the exercise of crafting their own resolution had important 
procedural justice implications82—it could help parties feel more empowered and 
lead to heightened morale.83 Mediation advocates argued that establishing trust and 
communication would positively transform the parties’ relationship and prevent 
future conflict.84 Indeed, when aggregated, the positive effects of mediation could 
improve civil discourse85 and society as a whole.86 
Although the arguments that mediation could alleviate pressure on court 
dockets, reduce costs, and also yield more satisfying resolution of disputes proved 
persuasive,87 the institutionalization of mediation did not move forward without 
                                                 
81 Menkel-Meadow, supra note 37, at 7 (“[T]he ‘limited remedial imagination’ of 
courts in providing outcomes restricts what possible solutions the parties could develop.”); 
see also Main, supra note 37. 
82 E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL 
JUSTICE 101–06 (1988) (proposing that individuals find processes fairer when given an 
opportunity to speak and tell their story); Jonathan M. Hyman & Lela P. Love, If Portia 
Were a Mediator: An Inquiry into Justice in Mediation, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 157, 172 
(2002) (arguing that fairness, from a disputant’s perspective, is closely connected to 
meaningful opportunities to tell one’s story and have that story be received with dignity 
and in an even-handed manner). 
83 A special workshop, “Identifying and Measuring the Quality of Dispute Resolution 
Processes and Outcomes,” hosted by the University of Wisconsin’s Dispute Processing 
Research Program in 1987, yielded insightful papers including Robert A. Baruch Bush, 
Defining Quality in Dispute Resolution: Taxonomies and Anti-Taxonomies of Quality 
Arguments, 66 DENV. U. L. REV. 335, 351 n.33 (1989) (connecting arguments of ADR 
practitioners and advocates to the six general definitions of “quality in dispute resolution 
processes or outcomes” developed out of the workshop). 
84 See, e.g., ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF 
MEDIATION: THE TRANSFORMATIVE APPROACH TO CONFLICT 41–84 (2005) (describing the 
way in which mediation interrupts the negative conflict spiral of disempowerment and 
demonization). 
85 See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary System in a 
Post-Modern, Multi-Cultural World, 1 J. INST. FOR STUDY LEGAL ETHICS 49, 69–72 
(1996); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Deliberative Democracy and Conflict Resolution: Two 
Theories and Practices of Participation in the Polity, 12 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 18, 18 (2005). 
86 Ackerman, supra note 76, at 31, 51, 71–75 (explaining that consensus-based 
processes build community because they are participant driven). 
87 Interestingly, perhaps with the exception of the studies cited earlier, the production 
argument has not borne out over time, but the quality argument has. See Donna 
Shestowsky, Disputants’ Preferences for Court-Connected Dispute Resolution Procedures: 
Why We Should Care and Why We Know So Little, 23 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 549, 
560–62, 560 n.37, 563–66 (2008) (“[E]mpirical evidence to-date offers little support for the 
idea that ADR reduces docket overload or promotes court efficiency.”); see also id. at 563 
(“Research has rather consistently shown that ADR subjectively appeals to ordinary 
citizens. They regard ADR procedures as fair and value them for providing an opportunity 
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plenty of skepticism. Many voices challenged the premise that ADR could improve 
access to justice for societies’ marginalized groups, such as communities of color, 
women, and the socioeconomically disadvantaged.88 
Nevertheless, across the country, during the 1980s and 1990s, state89 and 
federal90 courts and administrative agencies built mediation programs, either under 
their own initiative or at the behest of legislatures. Consider, for example, 
Oklahoma’s Dispute Resolution Act of 1983, the purpose of which was to 
“provide . . . convenient access to dispute resolution proceedings which are fair, 
effective, inexpensive, and expeditious.”91 With this law, the Oklahoma legislature 
authorized “[a]ny county, municipality, accredited law school or agency of this 
state” to establish mediation programs and tasked the Administrative Director of 
the Courts to administer the programs and “promulgate rules and regulations.”92 
Today, most public institutions employ their own mediators,93 contract with private 
                                                 
for voice and process control which promote self-determination.”); Wissler, supra note 47, 
at 660–73. 
88 See, e.g., Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of 
Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1359, 1359 (“[T]o protect 
minorities, ADR should be reserved for disputes in which parties of comparable status and 
power confront each other.”); Lisa G. Lerman, Mediation of Wife Abuse Cases: The 
Adverse Impact of Informal Dispute Resolution on Women, 7 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 57, 57–
61 (1984); Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 
YALE L.J. 1545, 1547–51 (1991); Penelope E. Bryan, Killing Us Softly: Divorce Mediation 
and the Politics of Power, 40 BUFF. L. REV. 441, 441–46 (1992); Eric K. Yamamoto, ADR: 
Where Have the Critics Gone?, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1055, 1058–66 (1996). 
89 For a discussion of how states establish statewide mediation programs, see Sharon 
Press, Building and Maintaining a Statewide Mediation Program: A View from the Field, 
81 KY. L.J. 1029, 1029–35 (1992). Although Professor Press wrote this article when the 
institutionalization of mediation in courts and administrative agencies was gaining 
momentum, her analysis and considerations remain relevant decades later. 
90 At the federal level, the U.S. Congress passed the Alternative Dispute Resolution 
Act in 1998 (codified as 28 U.S.C. § 651), authorizing all federal courts to develop ADR 
programs and the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act in 1990 (codified as 5 U.S.C. § 
571), which requires each federal administrative agency to adopt a policy addressing the 
use of ADR and to promote the use of ADR whenever appropriate. 
91 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1801 (2015) (“The Legislature is aware of the fact that 
many disputes arise between citizens of this state which are of small social or economic 
magnitude and can be both costly and time consuming if resolved through a formal judicial 
proceeding. Many times such disputes can be resolved in a fair and equitable manner 
through less formal proceedings. Such proceedings can also help alleviate the backlog of 
cases which burden the judicial system in this state. It is therefore the purpose of this act to 
provide to all citizens of this state convenient access to dispute resolution proceedings 
which are fair, effective, inexpensive, and expeditious.”). 
92 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1803(A) (2015). For an example of such rules and 
regulations, see KENTUCKY’S MODEL MEDIATION RULES (2012), http://courts.ky.gov/court 
programs/mediation/Pages/modelmediation.aspx [https://perma.cc/HA47-NRHA]. 
93 See, e.g., U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT, http://www.ca9.us 
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mediators for mediation services,94 or refer disputing parties to a freestanding 
mediation center.95 Across the country, almost all parties that turn to state 
institutions to resolve civil disputes are required to participate in some form of 
ADR and demonstrate their efforts to settle the dispute before a judge or agency 
decision maker will hear the case.96 
 
IV.  LEGISLATURES EXPAND BREADTH AND DEPTH OF THEIR MEDIATION 
MANDATES 
 
In recent years, particularly since the early 2000s, legislatures have 
increasingly deployed mediation as a means to regulate private parties’ dispute 
resolution. This phenomenon is a distinct departure from legislatures’ previous role 
in institutionalizing mediation. In earlier phases of mediation’s institutionalization, 
legislatures enacted statutes authorizing courts and administrative agencies to 
develop mediation programs, as the Oklahoma example above illustrates. Now, 
legislatures also embed mandatory mediation clauses directly into substantive 
law.97 Parties must mediate in order to assert or defend rights under statutes 
governing, for example, certain kinds of commercial contracts, insurance coverage, 
property transactions, and employment.98 
                                                 
courts.gov/mediation/view.php?pk_id=0000000676 [https://perma.cc/BL59-VCNK] 
(showing the Ninth Circuit has its own mediators who all work exclusively for the Court of 
Appeals). 
94 Wissler, supra note 47, at 654; see, e.g., 5-1-2 VT. CODE R. § 2, rules promulgated 
pursuant to VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6252 (2015) (Vermont’s Department of Housing and 
Community Development, which maintains a roster of mediators for rental disputes). 
95 Press, supra note 89, at 1041–48; see, e.g., Administrative Order No. 09-08 (Fla. 
11th Jud. Cir. Apr. 9, 2009), http://www.jud11.flcourts.org/documents/Administrative_ 
Orders/1-09-08-Establishment%20of%20HOME%20Mediation%20Program.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/F2PW-HY7T].  
96 COLE ET AL., supra note 1. 
97 This form of embedded procedure or substantive law with tailored procedure is 
different from the much discussed and debated issue of substance-specific procedure, by 
which certain federal rules of civil procedure are modified for particular kinds of claims. 
Not only are these statutes appearing at the state, not federal, level, but also the mandate to 
mediate appears directly in substantive statutory regimes. For more discussion and 
background into the debate around transsubstantive procedure versus substance-specific 
procedure, see Stephen N. Subrin, Fudge Points and Thin Ice in Discovery Reform and the 
Case for Selective Substance-Specific Procedure, 46 FLA. L. REV. 27, 27–29 (1994); 
Jeffrey W. Stempel, Halting Devolution or Bleak to the Future: Subrin’s New-Old 
Procedure as a Possible Antidote to Dreyfuss’s Tolstoy Problem, 46 FLA. L. REV. 57, 58–
60 (1994); Stephen N. Subrin, The Limitations of Transsubstantive Procedure: An Essay 
on Adjusting the “One Size Fits All” Assumption, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 377, 377–78 
(2010). 
98 Some statutory mediation mandates appear to do more than push parties to discuss 
settlement and in fact work to advance substantive policy objectives. For example, in the 
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Legislatures use mediation to regulate disputing parties in two different ways. 
First, they build mandatory mediation requirements into specific statutes to 
manage private citizens’ disputes directly, even before they turn to the government 
for assistance.99 Second, not only do legislatures mandate that parties mediate 
specific disputes, but they also instruct parties on how to mediate. Rather than 
leaving the mediation process unspecified or, in the alternative, delegating to 
courts and administrative agencies the task of developing rules for mediation, 
legislatures themselves design mediation procedure by building additional legal 
requirements into statutes. Through these mediation statutes, the legislature 
extends the breadth and depth of its control over private-party dispute processing. 
This Part explores both categories of statutory regulation. Section A presents 
statutes that embed mediation as mandatory dispute resolution procedure. These 
statutes impose a legal obligation to mediate on parties with certain kinds of 
disputes. Section B demonstrates that many statutory mandates to mediate go 
beyond requiring parties to try settling their disputes in mediation. Some 
legislatures, when constructing statutory mediation requirements, tack on 
additional legal obligations that control parties’ settlement negotiations and shape 
the outcome of the mediation process. Not only do these laws directly regulate 
parties’ behavior in mediation, but they can also influence the parties’ relationship 
by creating leverage and incentivizing settlement. These requirements transform 
mediation from its classical conception as an informal, delegalized, outcome-
neutral process—what made mediation so popular during the judicial reform 
movement—into a highly structured, formal process, with rules and procedures 
spelled out in statute. 
 
A.  Mandating Mediation for Specific Disputes 
 
States create legal obligations for private parties to mediate in a variety of 
contexts, including disputes relating to commercial contracts, insurance coverage, 
property rights, employment, and health.100 Many of these statutory mediation 
                                                 
foreclosure context, mediation statutes were passed with the intent to stop foreclosures, to 
save homeowners, and buoy the local housing market. See, e.g., H.R. 58, 146th Gen. 
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2011) (discussing the policy statement in Delaware House Bill 
58, Courts and Judicial Procedures—Foreclosure—Mediation). Lawmakers’ decision to 
deploy mediation for substantive public policy purposes is beyond the scope of this 
particular Article, but a topic I have explored elsewhere. Lydia Nussbaum, ADR’s Place in 
Foreclosure: Remedying the Flaws of a Securitized Housing Market, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 
1889, 1891, 1908 (2013). 
99 COLE ET AL., supra note 1. 
100 This Article focuses on statutes that mandate one or both parties to use mediation 
(using the search term “shall mediate”), particularly those that relate directly to private 
disputing parties in civil matters, although some statutes mandate mediation between 
private and public entities (e.g., Pennsylvania’s tax collection statute (53 PA. STAT. AND 
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6924.505 (2015)). Statutes that are not substance-specific are 
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requirements appear to have developed organically, in an ad hoc fashion, perhaps 
to respond to concerns about local industry practices, advocacy for consumer 
protection, or a desire to alleviate civil court dockets. 
One common area in which states deploy these statutory mediation mandates 
involves disputes between private commercial contracting parties, often relating to 
manufacturing and distribution contracts. For example, agricultural cooperatives in 
Maine and the handlers of their agricultural products,101 or electricity cooperatives 
in Texas and the cable operators who erect electric utility poles, all have a statutory 
requirement to mediate disputes.102 Florida, Texas, Virginia, and Wisconsin require 
mediation for disputes involving motor vehicle manufacturers and franchise car 
dealers.103 Maryland regulates private contracts between beer manufacturers and 
beer distributors. It requires mediation if a new entity takes over the manufacturing 
and wants to replace the old distributor with a new distributor, but the two 
distributors, old and new, cannot agree on a buyout amount for the distribution 
contract.104 Illinois requires telecommunications carriers to mediate with 
consumers upon request;105 similarly, Michigan requires informal alternative 
dispute resolution, including mediation, for complaints valued under $1,000 
brought against telecommunication carriers.106 In almost all of these contract 
disputes, the mediation mandate attaches directly to the parties, without the 
requirement of filing a claim with a court or administrative agency. 
Many states also impose legal obligations to mediate absent state institutional 
intervention in the insurance context. For example, claims involving condominium 
insurance in Washington,107 hazardous waste liability insurance in Oregon,108 and 
fire, earthquake and automobile insurance in California,109 are all subject to 
statutory mediation requirements. Similarly, in Texas, disputes over 
                                                 
excluded (e.g., statutes generally regulating mediators’ qualifications and experience, the 
effect of mediation on tolling of statutes of limitations, confidentiality and privileged 
mediation communications, as well as how mediation programs should be administered). 
101 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1958-B (2015). 
102 TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN. § 252.005 (West 2015). 
103 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 320.3210 (2015); TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 2301.522 (West 
2015); VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-1572.2 (West 2015); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 218.0136 (West 
2015). Virginia, unlike Texas, mandates mediation only when one of the parties requests 
mediation. 
104 MD. CODE ANN. art. 2B, § 21-103 (2015). These mediations might be more aptly 
called “beer summits.” 
105 220 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/13-713 (West 2013). 
106 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 484.2203a (West 2008). 
107 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 64.35.605 (West 2007) (requiring mediation of 
condominium insurance claims if the claimant (condominium unit owner or homeowners’ 
association) and the insurer have not been able to resolve the claim and one of the parties 
requests mediation). 
108 OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 465.484 (West 2013). 
109 CAL. INS. CODE § 10089.70 (West 2013) (making mediation mandatory only if one 
of the parties requests it). 
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reimbursement of out-of-network health insurance claims must also be 
mediated.110 
In addition to mandating mediation for conflicts between parties to a 
commercial or insurance contract, state legislatures also mandate that private 
parties mediate various disputes involving property rights. Legislatures in a 
number of nonjudicial foreclosure states111—for example, Hawaii,112 
Washington,113 and Nevada114—require mediation between eligible homeowners 
and mortgage lender representatives before the property can be sold at auction.115 
Multiple states require any construction defect issues to be mediated before a suit 
can be filed.116 In Hawaii, if a party to a dispute involving a condominium117 or 
planned community association118 requests mediation, the other party is legally 
obligated to participate. Gun shooting range operators in Vermont must mediate 
with neighboring property owners,119 and private solid waste facility licensees in 
Maine must use mediation if they cannot establish an agreement with their host 
community.120 Furthermore, real estate brokers in Colorado have a legal obligation 
to mediate with property owners in the event they dispute the commission for 
leasing commercial real estate.121 Legislators in Vermont and Washington enacted 
a law requiring landlords and tenants in mobile home parks to mediate eviction 
disputes. The landlord’s failure to participate in good faith is a legal defense to 
eviction.122 California and Oregon also mandate mediation of disputes between 
archeologists and American Indian tribes regarding repatriation of disinterred 
                                                 
110 TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 1467.056 (West 2012). An interesting thing to note is that 
parties may already be negotiating over insurance claims even without this statutory 
requirement to mediate. In which case, these mandates to mediate pull private discussions 
into the public sphere by laying down rules by which the negotiations should occur. 
111 Nonjudicial foreclosure allows lender representatives to initiate foreclosure 
privately, without obtaining an order of the court, as long as they comply with notice 
requirements. 
112 HAW. REV. STAT. Ann. § 667-71 (LexisNexis 2012); see id. § 667-74. 
113 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 61.24.030 (West 2007). 
114 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 107.086 (LexisNexis 2007). 
115 Nussbaum, supra note 98, at 1919–1944. 
116 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 64.55.120 (West 2007); CAL. CIV. CODE § 910 (West 
2007); id. § 919 (imposing a legal obligation on the contractor to include an offer to 
mediate with the offer to repair); HAW. REV. STAT. § 672E-1; see HAW. REV. STAT. § 
672E-7; NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40.680 (LexisNexis 2012). 
117 HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 514B-161 (West 2016). 
118 HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421J-13 (LexisNexis 2008); see also NEV. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 38.330 (LexisNexis 2013) (requiring mediation whether a party has requested it or 
not).  
119 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 5227a (2011). 
120 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 1310-N (West 2014). 
121 COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-22.5-101 (2015). 
122 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6252; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 59.20.080 (West 2015). 
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human skeletal remains or burial goods.123 Although the circumstances of these 
property-related disputes differ, each is governed by a statutory regime that legally 
requires affected parties to try resolving their disagreements in mediation before 
engaging state institutions for help. 
Statutory mandates to mediate without or before institutional intervention also 
appear in health-related disputes. For example, several state statutes require 
mediation of all causes of action for injuries arising from healthcare services.124 In 
New York, physicians at mental health facilities who believe a “do not resuscitate” 
order is no longer appropriate, but the individual who originally granted consent 
for the order refuses to revoke it, must submit the dispute to mediation or transfer 
the patient to another physician.125 In Florida, nursing home residents or their 
survivors who allege rights violations or negligence by the nursing home facility 
must complete a strict pre-suit process, laid out in detail by statute, which includes 
mandatory mediation.126 Individuals with complaints against adult family-care 
homes in Florida must also mediate if they want to recover attorney fees.127 As in 
the case of commercial, insurance, or property disputes, each particular statutory 
mediation scheme is specific to certain types of health disputes. 
Finally, there are mediation requirements relating to employment. In 
Colorado, for example, the state legislature passed the “Workplace 
Accommodations for Nursing Mothers Act,” which grants nursing mothers a legal 
right to pump or breast feed at the workplace and requires employers to make 
reasonable efforts to accommodate this right.128 Should a working mother believe 
her employer is violating her rights under the law, she must first mediate with her 
employer before initiating formal litigation.129 
These examples are by no means an exhaustive list. They serve to illustrate 
how legislatures impose mediation mandates directly on parties, rather than 
delegating that decision to courts and public agencies, as a means of encouraging 
resolution of a wide range of private disputes. 
 
B.  Controlling and Incentivizing Mediation Behavior 
 
As legislators increasingly embed mediation mandates into substantive 
statutes, many also specify in statute how the disputants shall utilize or behave in 
the mediation. Statutes regulate parties in mediation by 1) controlling who can and 
                                                 
123 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 8012 (West 2007) (describing dispute settlement 
process via mediation at id. § 8016(c)–(j)); OR. REV. STAT. § 390.240(1)(b) (2013). 
124 S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-79-125 (2015); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.70.100 (West 
2015) (stating that health care provider includes everyone from East Asian medicine 
practitioners to midwives, opticians, and paramedics). 
125 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2960 (McKinney 2012). 
126 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 400.0233 (West 2012). 
127 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 429.87 (West 2013). 
128 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-13.5-101 (West 2015). 
129 COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-13.5-104(5) (2012). 
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cannot participate; 2) mandating information exchange; 3) requiring parties to take 
negotiations seriously; 4) prescribing topics for discussion; 5) making mediation a 
condition precedent to a formal proceeding; and 6) incentivizing settlement.130 This 
type of regulation, whether purposeful or inadvertent, transforms mediation into a 
highly formalized, choreographed process with built-in procedural rules, rights, 
and restrictions. 
 
1.  Who Participates in Mediation 
 
Some statutes dictate who shall and who shall not participate in the mandatory 
mediation. In situations where one of the parties is an organization or business 
entity, policymakers will require an individual with settlement authority either to 
be physically present or participate by phone during the mediation.131 If it is 
unclear which parties are essential for resolving the dispute, some states deputize 
the mediator with the power to determine which parties are necessary for 
“effective” mediation.132 One purpose for requiring someone with settlement 
authority to participate in the mediation is to ensure that agreements reached in 
mediation are final and can indeed entirely conclude the matter in dispute. 
Statutes may also prohibit certain individuals, like legal counsel, from 
participating. For example, the state of California instructs mediators in insurance 
disputes to determine whether the insured party will be represented by legal 
counsel at the mediation and, if not, prohibits any legal counsel from being present 
in the mediation.133 One hypothesis for this policy is that legislatures may be trying 
to level the ground between the parties and avoid a “repeat player” phenomenon or 
situations in which one party has inherent bargaining advantage due to familiarity 
with the mediation process or greater legal sophistication.134 
                                                 
130 Some statutes have only one of these characteristics, while others have them all. 
For example, Nevada’s nonjudicial foreclosure mediation statute prescribes how and when 
parties shall mediate. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 107.086 (LexisNexis 2011). 
131 See 53 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT ANN. § 6924.505(k)(2)(iii) (West 2008) 
(mandating mediation for tax-collection disputes and requiring parties in attendance at 
mediation to have official authorization to settle the matter). 
132 E.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6321-A (2014) (stating that a “mediator shall 
include in the mediation process . . . any person the mediator determines is necessary for 
effective mediation”). 
133 CAL. INS. CODE § 10089.80(b) (West 2013) (“The mediator shall determine prior 
to the mediation conference whether the insured will be represented by counsel at the 
mediation. The mediator shall inform the insurer whether the insured will be represented by 
counsel at the mediation conference. If the insured is represented by counsel at the 
mediation conference, the insurer’s counsel may be present. If the insured is not 
represented by counsel at the mediation conference, then no counsel may be present.”). 
134 While this “repeat player” terminology was originally used by Professor Galanter 
in reference to parties in litigation, presumably the same phenomenon could exist in the 
mediation context as well. Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: 
Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 97–101 (1974) 
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2.  Information Exchange 
 
State statutes can also mandate that information be exchanged prior to or 
during the mediation session. Rather than leaving parties to exercise discretion 
about what information is disclosed in negotiations, legislatures require certain 
disclosures. Just as parties must comply with discovery rules when litigating, 
requirements to exchange information and documentation can function as “pre-
mediation discovery”135 to facilitate informed negotiations. For example, in the 
family law context, parents with a child-support dispute may be statutorily required 
to exchange affidavits and documentation showing most recent income and assets, 
as well as completed child support worksheets, before attending mandatory 
mediation.136 Such information exchange enables parties to negotiate in mediation 
with the most current information, ensuring that agreements reached are informed 
by events on the ground, not what may have been the case months earlier. In some 
instances, statutes require both parties to exchange not just documents, but to 
obtain outside information. For example, in addition to exchanging documentation, 
the law may further require meeting with experts prior to mediation in order to 
determine the validity of certain claims or to narrow down what the actual 
negotiable issues will be during the mediation session.137 
Some statutes may obligate only one of the parties to furnish information. A 
complainant might have to provide the other party with notice of the harm alleged 
and relief sought so that the responding party can conduct its own investigations in 
advance of mediation.138 Requiring a party to provide particular notice of alleged 
                                                 
(noting that litigants who utilize the courts frequently, so-called “repeat players,” as 
opposed to “one-shotters,” or claimants who rely on courts only occasionally, have inherent 
advantages: having litigated before, they have preexisting systems for court transactions; 
they can develop expertise and access specialists easily; they can establish informal 
relationships with institutional actors; they are more willing to fight for precedent to 
achieve more gains over the long term). 
135 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40.681 (West 2012). 
136 See ME. REV. STAT. tit. 19-A, § 2004 (“The plaintiff and defendant shall exchange, 
prior to mediation, affidavits regarding income and assets. These affidavits must conform 
with the forms provided by the court and must be accompanied by supporting 
documentation of current income, such as pay stubs, tax returns, employer statements or, if 
the plaintiff or defendant is self-employed, receipts and expenses . . . . The parties shall 
exchange prior to the commencement of mediation a completed child support worksheet. 
The worksheet must be completed in accordance with the support guidelines.”). 
137 See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 64.55.120(2) (West 2007) (mandating mediation for 
construction defects in multi-unit residential buildings and requiring that “[p]rior to the 
mediation required by this section, the parties and their experts shall meet and confer in 
good faith to attempt to resolve or narrow the scope of the disputed issues, including issues 
related to the parties’ repair plans”). 
138 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 400.0233(2) (West 2012) (mandating mediation of disputes 
alleging negligence or violation of resident rights by a nursing home and requiring “[p]rior 
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harm and relief sought might help clarify issues in dispute or ensure that claims 
lacking legal merit are excluded.139 These requirements are analogous to rules of 
civil procedure requiring pleadings to include a claim for relief.140 In contrast, the 
burden for generating documentation to demonstrate reasonableness of an alleged 
harm also can fall on the responding party. A Vermont law mandating mediation of 
disputes over rent increases at mobile home parks requires the park owner to 
provide documents and relevant information supporting the proposed rent increase, 
giving the park owner “the burden” of showing that the increase is reasonable.141 
Collectively, statutory mediation mandates that compel information exchange push 
parties to obtain factual support for their positions, an activity that might not 
otherwise occur naturally or in the absence of judicial or administrative 
intervention. 
 
3.  Good-Faith Negotiations 
 
When legislators require parties to negotiate in mediation, they often use 
statutes to ensure that the disputing parties take seriously the opportunity to 
negotiate. Often this takes the form of good-faith requirements or sometimes, 
consequences for mediating in bad faith, both of which are controversial practices 
also used by courts to motivate parties to make a sincere effort to resolve their 
disputes.142 To compel fair or cooperative behavior in mediation, which occurs 
                                                 
to filing a claim . . . a claimant . . . shall notify each prospective defendant by certified 
mail . . . of an asserted violation of a resident’s rights . . . or deviation from the standard of 
care. Such notification shall include an identification of the rights . . . violated and the 
negligence alleged . . . and a brief description of the injuries sustained by the resident 
which are reasonably identifiable at the time of notice.”). 
139 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 400.0233(2) (West 2012) (“The notice shall contain a 
certificate of counsel that counsel’s reasonable investigation gave rise to a good faith belief 
that grounds exist for an action against each prospective defendant.”). 
140 FED. R. CIV. P. 8. 
141 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6252(b) (2011) (“No later than five days before the initial 
mediation session, the mobile home park owner shall provide to the mediator and the 
leaseholders’ representative all documents and information that the park owner considers 
relevant to support the proposed lot rent increase. The mobile home park owner shall have 
the burden of providing information to show that proposed lot rent increase is 
reasonable.”). See infra notes 241–243 and accompanying text (discussing prescribed 
topics for mediation that have a similar effect of creating transparency between the parties). 
142 Requirements for good-faith participation in mediation are hotly debated. 
Proponents of a good-faith requirement argue that it provides general guidelines for good 
conduct, a cause of action for parties on the receiving end of bad behavior, and, if courts 
are willing to serve up sanctions against good-faith violators, cooperation from otherwise 
uncooperative parties. The good-faith requirement can be broadly construed as a totality of 
circumstances surrounding party conduct, see Maureen A. Weston, Checks on Participant 
Conduct in Compulsory ADR: Reconciling the Tension in the Need for Good-Faith 
Participation, Autonomy, and Confidentiality, 76 IND. L.J. 591, 627 (2001) (distinguishing 
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behind closed doors and out of the public eye, legislators legally obligate parties to 
fair dealing. Statutes may either include general good-faith requirements143 or lay 
out specific criteria constituting bad faith, such as failure to attend mediation 
sessions without cause, failure to provide full information, or participant failure to 
have settlement authority in mediation.144 
Of course, even when legislation compels meaningful participation in the 
mediation, policing behavior still poses a challenge. Some states address this issue 
by requiring the mediator to report lapses in good faith observed during mediated 
negotiations.145 Others empower the well-behaved party with a new cause of 
action: failure to mediate in good faith.146 Legislators also use this downstream 
approach by assigning courts the task of ascertaining whether parties appearing in 
                                                 
bad faith from hard bargaining), or as specific, demonstrable conduct such as attending 
mediation with settlement authority, following the mediator’s rules, and engaging in 
meaningful and direct negotiation discussions. Kimberlee K. Kovach, Good Faith in 
Mediation—Requested, Recommended, or Required? A New Ethic, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 575, 
622–23 (1997). Opponents argue that good-faith requirements violate mediation 
confidentiality and give mediators too much power because the only way to demonstrate 
lack of good faith for purposes of obtaining judicial sanctions is from mediator reporting or 
testimony. John Lande, Using Dispute System Design Methods to Promote Good-Faith 
Participation in Court-Connected Mediation Programs, 50 UCLA L. REV. 69, 102–08 
(2002). A further concern is that parties will threaten each other with bad-faith claims as a 
strategy for gaining leverage in negotiations. John Lande, Why a Good-Faith Requirement 
Is a Bad Idea for Mediation, 23 ALTERNATIVES HIGH COST LITIG. 1, 9 (2005). 
143 See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1958-B (2005) (“Regardless whether 
mediation is sought mutually or unilaterally, both parties shall participate in mediation in 
good faith.”). 
144 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 583.27(1)(a) (West 2010) (obligating good-faith 
participation from parties in farm creditor mediation); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 1467.101(a) 
(West 2009) (enumerating behavior constituting bad faith in health insurance mediation). 
Both the Texas and Minnesota statutes make sure to clarify, however, that a failure to agree 
does not evidence proof of bad faith. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 1467.101(b); MINN. STAT. 
ANN. § 583.27(1)(a). 
145 See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 4634(a), (b)(5) (2015) (requiring the mediator 
in a foreclosure action to file a written report outlining the results of the mediation process 
and, among other things, identifying whether any party failed to attend the mediation, 
participate in good faith, or provide statutorily mandated information); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 
583.27(2) (West 2010) (requiring mediator to file an affidavit with parties and with 
mediation program director). 
146 See, e.g., Pasillas v. HSBC Bank USA, 255 P.3d 1281, 1283 (Nev. 2011) (holding 
that the foreclosing party should be sanctioned for failure to bring a required document to 
mediation and have a person with settlement authority present at mediation, both of which 
were duties required by state statute and supreme court rules); Leyva v. Nat’l Default 
Servicing Corp., 255 P.3d 1275, 1281 (Nev. 2011) (holding that loan servicer 
representative’s failure to bring to mediation required documents showing assignment of 
the deed of trust and mortgage note qualified as bad faith under Nevada’s Foreclosure 
Mediation Rules and was a “sanctionable” offense). 
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a formal hearing made a good-faith effort to settle in mediation.147 Statutes can 
empower judges with a variety of sanctions if bad-faith participation in mediation 
comes to the attention of the court. Consequences for failing to negotiate in good 
faith can result in dismissal of the case or default judgment against the 
misbehaving party.148 Parties can suffer monetary punishment, such as 
compensating the other party for time and lost wages, covering the full cost of the 
mediator, or paying the other party’s attorney’s fees.149 While these statutes do not 
constitute a direct mandate on the parties, they can still have a regulatory effect on 
behavior, as parties will want to avoid potential sanctions down the road. They also 
create potential causes of action for parties that, in turn, become new fulcra that 
parties can use as leverage during negotiations. 
 
4.  Prescribed Topics for Mediation Discussions 
 
Legislators also direct parties on what—and what not—to discuss in 
mediation.150 This prescriptiveness appears, for example, in child-custody disputes 
where statutes mandate parties to discuss topics like custody and visitation issues, 
but prohibit financial discussions related to child and spousal support.151 In this 
type of dispute, appropriate topics for negotiation are distinguished from 
inappropriate topics, presumably based on policymakers’ perceptions of relative 
imbalances of power between the parties.152 Legislators appear willing to delegate 
decision-making authority about residential schedules, health, and education to 
                                                 
147 See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6004-A (2014) (mandating landlord-
tenant mediation and requiring that “[w]hen agreement through mediation is not reached on 
an issue, the court shall determine that the parties made a good faith effort to mediate the 
issue before proceeding with a hearing”). 
148 See, e.g., id. (“If the court finds that either party failed to make a good faith effort 
to mediate, the court may order the parties to submit to mediation, may dismiss the action 
or a part of the action, may render a decision or judgment by default, may assess attorney’s 
fees and costs or may impose any other sanction that is appropriate in the circumstances.”). 
149 E.g., id.; see also California’s penalties for parties that fail to appear at insurance 
mediation without good cause. CAL. INS. CODE § 10089.81 (West 2013) (stating that the 
insurer shall pay the consumer for her actual expenses incurred in attending the conference 
plus the value of lost wages, while an insured who fails to appear loses his or her right to 
mediate and has to pay all costs charged by the mediator). 
150 For example, Texas law requires parties disputing out-of-network insurance 
provider payments to discuss the amount charged, whether that amount was customary, as 
well as whether and to whom additional costs need to be paid. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 
1467.056 (West 2011). 
151 See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50-13.1(b) (2013) (“[C]ontested issue as to the 
custody or visitation of a minor child, the matter . . . shall be set for mediation of the 
unresolved issues as to custody and visitation . . . . Alimony, child support, and other 
economic issues may not be referred for mediation pursuant to this section.”). 
152 See Bryan, supra note 88; Grillo, supra note 88; cf. Mnookin & Kornhauser, infra 
note 216. 
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children’s parents, but reserve the authority to determine family finances for the 
state courts.153 
Another tactic legislators employ to direct party negotiations is to provide an 
exhaustive list of topics for parties to discuss in mediation. In the mortgage 
foreclosure mediation context, homeowners and lender representatives154 can be 
required by law to talk in mediation about all details relating to the structure of the 
loan, payment history, circumstances around the default, as well as all available 
alternatives to foreclosure. Vermont’s foreclosure mediation statute enumerates 
each foreclosure prevention alternative to be discussed during mediation, from 
loan modification to forbearance to short sale; if the foreclosing party refuses to 
offer any alternative or to modify the terms of the homeowner loan, then it must 
provide justification.155 In Maine, on the other hand, the foreclosing party can also 
                                                 
153 N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50-13.1(b)(1)–(5) (2013): 
 
The purposes of mediation . . . include . . . the following goals: (1) To reduce 
any acrimony that exists between the parties to a dispute involving custody or 
visitation of a minor child; (2) The development of custody and visitation 
agreements that are in the child’s best interest; (3) To provide the parties with 
informed choices and, where possible, to give the parties the responsibility for 
making decisions about child custody and visitation; (4) To provide a structured, 
confidential, nonadversarial setting that will facilitate the cooperative resolution 
of custody and visitation disputes and minimize the stress and anxiety to which 
the parties, and especially the child, are subjected; and (5) To reduce the 
relitigation of custody and visitation disputes. 
 
154 This is a simplification—because of the securitization of home mortgages into 
investment instruments, most homeowners never mediate with their lenders. For an 
expanded explanation of how securitization impacts foreclosure negotiations, see 
Nussbaum, supra note 98, at 1893–1908. 
155 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 4633(a) (2015): 
 
During all mediations under this subchapter:  
(1) The parties shall address the available foreclosure prevention tools and, if 
disputed, the amount due on the note for the principal, interest, and costs or 
fees.  
(2) The mortgagee shall use and consider available foreclosure prevention tools, 
including reinstatement, loan modification, forbearance, and short sale, and the 
applicable government loss mitigation program requirements and any related 
“net present value” calculations used in considering a loan modification 
conducted under this subchapter.  
(3) The mortgagee shall produce for the mortgagor and mediator: 
(A) if a modification or other agreement is not offered, an explanation why the 
mortgagor was not offered a modification or other agreement; and 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be required, during the mediation itself, to demonstrate the calculations it 
conducted, including numeric inputs for the equations used to determine whether 
or not foreclosure is in the best interest of the loan investors.156 
A statutory mandate does not guarantee compliance; thus, legislators may 
require the mediator to keep a record of the topics discussed to ensure parties 
actually have the discussions intended under the law. For example, Maryland’s 
foreclosure mediation program requires mediators to complete a state-generated 
checklist of all potential alternatives to foreclosure, have the parties sign it at the 
conclusion of mediation, and then file the signed list with the administrative 
agency supervising the program.157 Taken together, these statutes demonstrate that 
legislatures not only want parties to mediate specific kinds of disputes, but also 
have a particular idea about the appropriate form and content of those mediation 
discussions.  
 
5.  Mediation as Condition Precedent to Formal Hearing 
 
Legislatures, in the interest of having parties communicate directly with each 
other before turning to formal administrative or judicial hearings, often make 
mediation a condition precedent to filing a formal complaint with a government 
                                                 
(B) for any applicable government loss mitigation program, the criteria for the 
program and the inputs and calculations used in determining the homeowner’s 
eligibility for a modification or other program. 
 
156 See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6321-A(13) (West 2014): 
 
The mediator’s report must indicate in a manner as determined by the court that 
the parties completed in full the Net Present Value Worksheet in the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation Loan Modification Program Guide . . . . If the 
mediation did not result in the settlement or dismissal of the action, the report 
must include the outcomes of the Net Present Value Worksheet . . . . As part of 
the report, the mediator may notify the court if, in the mediator’s opinion, either 
party failed to negotiate in good faith. 
 
157 MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 7-105.1(1) (West 2008): 
 
(ii) At the commencement of a postfile mediation session, each party shall 
review the mediation checklist. (iii) The mediator shall mark each item on the 
mediation checklist as the item is addressed at the postfile mediation session. 
(iv) At the conclusion of a postfile mediation session, each party shall sign the 
mediation checklist. 
 
The checklist used in Maryland can be found at MD. CODE REGS. 09.03.12.10 apps. 
OAH-3 to OAH-4, http://www.dsd.state.md.us/artwork/090312Appendices.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5GU7-B77V]. 
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entity.158 These statutes, like South Carolina’s medical malpractice statute, make 
clear that parties should sit down and talk about the perceived injury and the 
circumstances in which the injury occurred before filing or initiating a civil 
action.159 Sometimes the statute transforms mediation into the first step of a formal 
complaint, prohibiting a party from proceeding with filing a formal pleading until 
the mediation process is completely exhausted.160 Similarly, some statutes blur the 
line between formal filing and informal dispute resolution by mandating the 
aggrieved party to supply a statement of harm and a request for relief to the 
respondent as part of the pre-file mediation process.161 
To demonstrate compliance with the law, the party filing the complaint may 
have to include a sworn affidavit with its pleading that attests to the fact that the 
parties attempted, in good faith, to mediate the issues addressed in the complaint, 
                                                 
158 See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.70.100(1) (West 2012) (mandating 
mediation for all causes of action related to medical malpractice claims by requiring that 
“[b]efore a superior court trial, all causes of action, whether based in tort, contract, or 
otherwise, for damages arising from injury occurring as a result of health care provided 
after July 1, 1993, shall be subject to mandatory mediation prior to trial”); COLO. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 8-13.5-104(5) (West 2012) (requiring nursing mothers to mediate disputes 
over breastfeeding in the workplace before seeking litigation). Sometimes legislatures only 
mandate mediation as a step before the parties can appeal. E.g., TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 
42.226 (West 2011) (“On motion by a party to an appeal under this chapter, the court shall 
enter an order requiring the parties to attend mediation. The court may enter an order 
requiring the parties to attend mediation on its own motion.”). 
159 S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-79-125 (2015) (requiring a plaintiff to issue a Notice of 
Intent to File Suit, which contains “a short and plain statement of the facts showing that the 
party filing the notice is entitled to relief, must be signed by the plaintiff or by his attorney, 
and must include any standard interrogatories,” and an affidavit of an expert witness). 
160 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 910 (West 2007) (detailing “non-adversarial” 
prelitigation procedures for construction defect complaints, which require i) a homeowner 
to notify the builder and provide details of the alleged violation, ii) the builder to respond 
to the complaint by providing all relevant plans and documentation related to the 
construction project, iii) the builder to conduct inspections within a two-week timeframe 
and to include with any offers of repair an offer to mediate); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 218.0136 
(West 1999) (“A licensee may not file a complaint or petition with the division of hearings 
and appeals or bring an action . . . unless the licensee serves a demand for mediation upon 
the other licensee before or contemporaneous with the filing of the complaint or petition or 
the bringing of the action.”). 
161 See supra Part IV.B.2 and accompanying notes, particularly FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 
400.011–400.0233 (West 2002). The statutory requirement to mediate, however, does not 
identify who must initiate mediation nor does it state explicitly that mediation is a 
condition precedent to filing. Indeed, the District Court of Appeals for Florida’s Fifth 
District noted the confusion in the statute about whether failure to mediate was a bar to 
filing in court. Kissimmee Health Care Assocs. v. Garcia, 76 So. 3d 1107, 1108 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 2011) (upholding a lower court’s decision denying nursing home operator’s 
petition to dismiss the claim from a plaintiff who did not mediate before filing). 
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but were unsuccessful.162 Alternatively, the mediator may be required by law to 
file a report or mediator’s certificate with the court or administrative agency 
certifying that the parties attempted, unsuccessfully, to resolve the issues in good 
faith.163 Only subsequently may the parties turn to the court or administrative 
agency to resolve their dispute. 
 
6.  Incentivizing Settlement 
 
Finally, legislatures influence mediation outcomes by building incentives for 
settlement and sometimes directing mediators to make decisions for the parties. 
For example, some statutes create economic risk for parties that fail to settle by 
borrowing a technique from nonbinding arbitration to encourage settlement.164 One 
such statute in Florida involves mandated mediation of complaints against adult 
family-care homes, which operate much like foster care, but for adults instead of 
children.165 In situations where the parties do not settle, the law requires mediators 
to record in a written report the last settlement offer made by the defendant; if the 
matter proceeds to trial and the complaining party prevails, but is awarded a 
smaller amount in damages, the plaintiff is barred from recovering attorney’s 
fees.166 These mediation rules parallel offer-of-judgment rules.167 It seems likely 
                                                 
162 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38.330(1) (LexisNexis 2013) (“Any complaint filed in 
such an action must contain a sworn statement indicating that the issues addressed in the 
complaint have been mediated pursuant to the provisions of NRS 38.300 to 38.360, 
inclusive, but an agreement was not obtained.”). A required affidavit of a good-faith effort 
to resolve the dispute parallels the affidavit required in discovery disputes when filing a 
motion to compel. 
163 HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 667-81(a), (b) (LexisNexis 2012) (requiring the third-
party neutral in informal dispute resolution regarding nonjudicial mortgage foreclosure 
actions to file a closing report verifying parties’ attendance and participation and, if no 
agreement is reached, that the parties met program requirements; the foreclosing party may 
record the mediator’s report and proceed with the foreclosure process). For more 
discussion on good faith, see supra Part IV.B.3 and accompanying notes. 
164 Jacqueline Nolan-Haley argues that mediation procedures are beginning to look 
more like arbitration in that they are increasingly adversarial and rights-based. Nolan-
Haley, supra note 35, at 83–86, 89–91. 
165 “Adult family care homes are private residences licensed to provide housing, 
meals, and personal care services to elderly and disabled adults who cannot live 
independently.” Providers live with the residents they serve. DEP’T OF ELDER AFFAIRS, 
STATE OF FLORIDA, Adult Family Care Homes, http://elderaffairs.state.fl.us/doea/afch.php 
[https://perma.cc/NG7G-BZWW] (last visited Jan. 19, 2016). 
166 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 429.87(2)(b) (West 2014) (“If the parties do not settle the case 
pursuant to mediation, the last offer of the defendant made at mediation shall be recorded 
by the mediator in a written report that states the amount of the offer, the date the offer was 
made in writing, and the date the offer was rejected. If the matter subsequently proceeds to 
trial under this section and the plaintiff prevails but is awarded an amount in damages, 
exclusive of attorney’s fees, which is equal to or less than the last offer made by the 
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that a risk-averse complainant will accept a settlement offer in mediation rather 
than proceed with the cost of litigation, face the possibility of a smaller award, and 
then not be able to recover the attorney’s fees associated with the continued 
litigation. This example demonstrates a situation in which the mediation process, 
as constructed by statute, applies special pressure on only one party, the 
complainant, to accept settlement offered in mediation rather than risk the 
uncertainty of what a judge could decide. The complainant retains the power to 
decide whether to accept a settlement offer, but that decision is anchored in a 
context of taking or avoiding a financial risk, which exists because the statute 
created it. 
Sometimes, in incentivizing settlement, legislatures appear to take advantage 
of the mediator’s presence as a third party. For example, some statutes require the 
mediator to connect parties to assistance programs, directly provide advice and 
counsel to the parties, or actively encourage the parties to settle the dispute.168 
Rarely, a statute can instruct a mediator to make a decision for the parties in the 
event they cannot develop a resolution on their own.169 It remains unclear whether 
imbuing the mediator with legal authority to determine a resolution is intended to 
be helpful to parties that are truly at a loss for ideas or as a threat to induce parties 
to settle themselves (as if the mediator were to say, “if you two cannot make up 
your minds then I will decide and you might not like it!”). Many might argue that 
these forms of mandatory mediation are, in fact, not mediation at all because they 
violate mediation’s core principles of consensus, party autonomy, and mediator 
neutrality. It may be that legislators intended the dispute resolution to be a 
mediation-arbitration process and mislabeled it “mediation.” On the other hand, 
this may just be an articulation of how mediators’ evaluations are beginning to 
creep toward the arbitrator’s role.170 
                                                 
defendant at mediation, the plaintiff is not entitled to recover any attorney’s fees.” This 
applies “only to claims for liability and damages” and not equitable relief. Id. § 
429.87(2)(c)). 
167 See, e.g., Albert Yoon & Tom Baker, Offer-of-Judgment Rules and Civil 
Litigation: An Empirical Study of Automobile Insurance Litigation in the East, 59 VAND. 
L. REV. 155, 160–63 (2006). 
168 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 2-7-308(b)(1)–(5) (2015) (outlining the 
responsibilities of farm-foreclosure mediators and providing that “[a]t the initial mediation 
meeting and subsequent meetings, the mediator shall . . . (3) Advise the farmer and creditor 
as to the existence of available assistance programs; (4) Encourage the parties to adjust, 
refinance, or provide for the payment of the farmer’s debts; and (5) Advise, counsel, and 
assist the farmer and creditors in attempting to arrive at an agreement for the future conduct 
of financial relations among the parties or to arrive at a settlement which may be stipulated 
to in court for the resolution to the court action”). 
169 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 8016 (West 2007) (requiring a mediator to issue 
decisions in disputes over repatriation of human remains). 
170 See Peter Salem, The Emergence of Triage in Family Court Services: The 
Beginning of the End for Mandatory Mediation?, 47 FAM. CT. REV. 371, 378 (2009). 
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By obligating parties to mediate and then regulating parties’ conduct through 
mandates or sanctions, lawmakers directly influence the mediation process and, as 
a consequence, its outcomes. Why, then, is a process like mediation, classically 
characterized by informality and a lack of prefabricated structure, being deployed 
in such a structured, rule-based way to resolve disputes? The remainder of this 
Article presents one possible explanation for this phenomenon and explores 
considerations for policymakers and mediation advocates when issuing these 
mediation mandates. 
 
V.  MEDIATION, REGULATION, AND GOVERNANCE 
 
Classical mediation’s lack of formality and capacity to empower private 
parties drove its early institutionalization in courts and administrative agencies. 
Lawmakers’ latest application of mediation, however, recasts mediation as a 
regulatory tool.171 When substantive statutes include embedded mediation 
mandates or when statutes exert both formal and informal control over parties’ 
behavior in mediation, the effect is regulation of parties’ dispute processing. 
Mediation therefore shifts from an opportunity for private ordering into a 
mechanism by which disputes and disputants are governed by state intervention. 
These statutes should be characterized as “regulation” because it offers a more 
accurate description of the power dynamic between the state and its citizens than 
the public-private, formal-informal dichotomies that have long dominated 
discussions of ADR. 
Yet why would lawmakers choose to embed mediation requirements into new 
legislation? Even more puzzling, why alter the traditional boundaries between 
public and private dispute resolution by selecting an informal process like 
mediation and then adding legal obligations that control parties’ behavior? 
Unfortunately, for many of these statutes, evidence of clear legislative intent to 
answer these questions proves elusive.172 
                                                 
171 Regulation, like mediation, faces a definitional challenge because it takes on 
different meanings in different contexts. For example, legal scholars perceive regulation as 
an instrument of administrative law, sociologists and criminologists cast regulation as a 
form of social control, economists consider regulation a strategic tool for shaping market 
behavior, scholars of public administration define regulation as the scope of state authority, 
and scholars of global governance see regulation as international standards and soft norms. 
David Levi-Faur, Regulation and Regulatory Governance, in HANDBOOK ON THE POLITICS 
OF REGULATION 3, 3–4 (David Levi-Faur ed., 2011) [hereinafter Levi-Faur, Regulation and 
Regulatory Governance]. 
172 Many question whether a body of legislators can have a single-minded intent and 
many also debate which materials indicate intent (statutory language, legislative history, 
testimony, statements from key legislators, press releases, etc.). For a useful discussion and 
review of the literature, see Richard I. Nunez, The Nature of Legislative Intent and the Use 
of Legislative Documents as Extrinsic Aids to Statutory Interpretation: A Reexamination, 9 
CAL. W. L. REV. 128, 128–35 (1972). 
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One possible explanation emerges by applying regulatory-governance theory. 
Regulatory governance is an interdisciplinary field that studies the interdependent 
relationship between governments and the governed.173 This governance 
relationship has taken different forms throughout history. One form of regulatory 
governance, decentralized governance, constructs procedures that shift the power 
to regulate from the state to civil society in an effort to promote efficiency and 
render regulation more democratic, breaking down traditional lines between public 
and private spheres of authority.174  
Decentralized governance and the idea of using procedure to shift power from 
the state to civil society mirrors what is happening in the dispute resolution 
context. Statutory mediation mandates relocate authority over dispute resolution 
from the state to private parties, creating opportunities for disputants to negotiate 
directly and resolve their conflicts without state adjudication yet within procedural 
parameters laid down by the state. Indeed, formalizing mediation procedure in 
statute can be understood as the state’s effort to build procedural architecture for 
decentralized dispute processing. This Part first explains why mediation mandates 
should be defined as regulation; then briefly sets out different theoretical models of 
state regulatory governance; and then argues that one governance paradigm in 
particular—decentralized governance—offers the best model for understanding 
this new frontier in mediation’s institutionalization. 
 
A.  Reframing Mediation Mandates as Regulation 
 
One can characterize mediation as “regulation” in a number of different ways. 
As discussed in the previous Part, legislatures deploy a range of mediation 
mandates that impose different kinds of requirements on private actors. Similarly, 
there are different ways to define regulation, the three most common of which 
range from more to less directive. Regulation can be i) a “specific set of 
commands,” or binding, legal rules backed by sanctions; ii) “deliberate state 
influence” over economic and social behavior (this category includes economic 
incentives like taxes or subsidies, deployment of resources, and supply of 
                                                 
173 Or, more precisely, regulatory governance explores the formal and informal 
controls that government exerts over private actors through government (in)actions, which 
in turn are influenced by the regulated entities themselves. Levi-Faur, Regulation and 
Regulatory Governance, supra note 171, at xvi. “Thus governance, defined as any strategy, 
process, procedure, or program for controlling, regulating, or exercising authority over 
either animate or inanimate objects or populations, is regarded as being much broader than 
the traditional conception of state-centred regulation.” Peter Swan, Governing at a 
Distance: An Introduction to Law, Regulation, and Governance, in LAW, REGULATION, 
AND GOVERNANCE 1, 11 (Michael Mac Neil, Neil Sargent & Peter Swan eds., 2002) 
[hereinafter Swan, Governing at a Distance]. 
174 See sources cited infra note 197. 
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information to the public); and iii) “all forms of social and economic influence,” 
whether state-based or private, deliberate or incidental.175 
Mediation mandates should be thought of as regulation under each of these 
three definitions. For example, when legislatures mandate mediation and include 
sanctions for, or causes of action against, parties that do not cooperate,176 they 
regulate parties’ dispute resolution processing according to the first, most directive 
idea of state regulation. The state commands parties to mediate by issuing binding, 
legal rules and lays out punishments should the command not be followed. 
Legislatures’ use of mediation mandates also constitute regulation according to the 
second definition, which identifies regulation as deliberate influence over 
socioeconomic behavior. For example, when legislatures predicate recovery of 
attorneys’ fees on settlement offers made in mediation or require public institutions 
to make mediation a mandatory first step, thereby lengthening administrative 
procedures,177 legislatures create economic incentives for parties to negotiate rather 
than invest the financial resources required for litigation. And finally, statutes 
mandating mediation also fit the third, least directive concept of regulation. 
Embedding mediation into substantive statutes surely influences how disputing 
parties engage the question of how to resolve their differences.178 These statutes 
                                                 
175 ROBERT BALDWIN, MARTIN CAVE & MARTIN LODGE, UNDERSTANDING 
REGULATION: THEORY, STRATEGY, AND PRACTICE 3 (2d ed. 2012). See also Julia Black, 
Critical Reflections on Regulation, 27 AUSTL. J. LEGAL PHIL. 1 (2002) (cataloguing 
different conceptions of regulation and explaining a decentered understanding of 
regulation); BARRY M. MITNICK, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGULATION: CREATING, 
DESIGNING, AND REMOVING REGULATORY FORMS 2–20 (1980) (defining regulation as “the 
intentional restriction of a subject’s choice of activity by an entity not directly party to or 
involved in that activity”); ANTHONY OGUS, REGULATION: LEGAL FORM AND ECONOMIC 
THEORY 1–5 (1994) (defining regulation narrowly, as a politico-economic concept, with 
three key characteristics—directive (individuals are compelled by higher state authority), 
inhabiting public law, and centralized state power); Susan S. Silbey, Organizational 
Challenges to Regulatory Enforcement and Compliance: A New Common Sense About 
Regulation, 649 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 6, 7 (2013) (noting that government 
regulation is a way to “describe macroeconomic processes,” as well as a way to describe 
“the relationship between law and its consequences” (the “difference between law-on-the-
books and law-in-action”); regulation is the “instrumentality of law” to organize social 
relations and produce “particular desired conditions”). 
176 See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 667-82 (LexisNexis 2012) (imposing sanctions 
for a party failing to comply with foreclosure mediation requirements including a $1,500 
fine and, for homeowners, lifting the stay of foreclosure, and for mortgagees, imposing a 
stay of foreclosure). 
177 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3323.05(F) (LexisNexis 2013) (requiring the 
state board of education to create an opportunity for parents to mediate disputes involving 
any matter). 
178 See generally Stipanowich & Lamare, supra note 44 (discussing the “modern 
evolution” of how different ADR processes are used in the corporate environment and 
analyzing parties’ changing perceptions about ADR). 
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promote consensus-based dispute resolution as a new norm and send a message to 
parties that they should attempt to work out their dispute themselves rather than 
reflexively turning to formal adjudication with public institutions.  
Thus, mediation statutes constitute regulation under each definition, in some 
cases as direct state control with enforcement mechanisms and in other cases as 
indirect activity that influences citizens’ behavior or creates new societal norms. 
Having established that mediation mandates fit the different definitions of 
regulation, one can then assess different theories of regulation, or how states use 
regulation to govern to further certain policy objectives.  
 
B.  Theories of Regulatory Governance: Liberal Versus Interventionist 
 
Historically, governments had different policy objectives and executed their 
regulatory duties differently; as a consequence, different themes or models of 
regulatory governance have emerged. At the beginning of the twentieth century, 
North American and Western European states changed how they used law to 
govern society.179 States moved away from the paradigm of classical liberalism, 
which uses law to protect private individuals’ security and freedom by containing 
the power of a potentially dangerous state,180 toward an interventionist theory of 
state governance.181 Under a liberal model of governance, laws established 
negative liberties that placed limits on the state’s ability to interfere with private 
individuals’ positive rights to contract freely and own property. This is because the 
bourgeoisie of the nineteenth century wanted the same access to, and freedom in, 
economic markets that the ruling class and political elites enjoyed.182 
However, influenced by world war and the rise of mass politics, legal 
theorists argued for an interventionist state that would provide a “social safety net” 
guaranteeing minimal living conditions and security for economically weak 
members of society.183 This idea, strengthening public law to fix social 
                                                 
179 Not coincidentally, during this same period of time in the United States, called the 
Progressive Era, Roscoe Pound and other legal reformers were calling for changes to the 
American legal landscape to improve citizens’ access to justice. Pound, supra note 59. 
180 Jürgen Habermas, Paradigms of Law, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 771, 772–73 (1996). 
In discussing why law holds private individuals liable for certain kinds of tort instead of 
public payout for damages, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. wrote in The Common Law that 
state machinery “ought not to be set in motion unless some clear benefit is to be derived 
from disturbing the status quo. State interference is an evil, where it cannot be shown to be 
a good.” OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 96 (1881). 
181 Swan, Governing at a Distance, supra note 173, at 4. 
182 Id. 
183 Id. at 2–4 (citing 2 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF 
INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY 641, 880–89 (G. Roth & C. Wittich eds., 1978)). Specifically, in 
the United States, legal realists like Robert Lee Hale argued that “corrective legislation” 
like public works, government enterprises, and deficit financing would combat the excesses 
of laissez-faire capitalism and equalize bargaining power between the economically 
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inequalities, profoundly impacted American public policy, from Roosevelt’s New 
Deal184 to Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society,185 and led to a vast expansion in 
regulatory agencies and rules.186 This fifty-year period in American history 
included reforms to the banking system, Social Security, housing, food safety, and 
labor and employment, to name a few.187 
In the 1970s the interventionist model of state governance and its concomitant 
regulatory bureaucracy came under attack, criticized from all sides of the political 
spectrum for ineffectiveness and inefficiency.188 Neoliberals called for 
                                                 
powerful and less powerful without jeopardizing economic liberty. Robert L. Hale, 
Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 603, 606, 626–28 (1943). 
184 Trevor Purvis, Regulation, Governance, and the State: Reflections on the 
Transformation of Regulatory Practices in Late-Modern Liberal Democracies, in LAW, 
REGULATION, AND GOVERNANCE, supra note 173, at 28, 34–37 [hereinafter Purvis, 
Regulation, Governance, and the State]; Swan, Governing at a Distance, supra note 173, at 
7. 
185 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE 
REGULATORY STATE 18–32 (1990). 
186 From 1936 to 1977, the number of pages of federal regulations grew from 2,599 to 
65,603, tripling during the 1970s. STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 1 
(1982). The Federal Register reports that in 2013 the Code of Federal Regulations consists 
of 166,352 pages, excluding indices and compiled Title 3 documents. OFFICE OF THE FED. 
REGISTER, C.F.R. PAGE BREAKDOWN – 1975 THROUGH 2013, chart 13 (2014), 
https://www.federalregister.gov/uploads/2014/04/CFR-Actual-Pages-published1-2013.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4SQP-ZJ2A]. 
187 SUNSTEIN, supra note 185. 
188 BREYER, supra note 186, at 2–3; Purvis, Regulation, Governance, and the State, 
supra note 184, at 37–38. A primary argument leveled at state regulation was that the 
government’s regulatory apparatus had been captured, or co-opted, by the same industries 
it was supposed to monitor and therefore, could no longer regulate in the best interest of the 
public. George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. 
SCI. 3–4 (1971). Another argument was that regulation was fundamentally undemocratic: 
regulation was the work of administrative agencies, housed in the executive branch and run 
by appointed, unelected bureaucrats wielding tremendous power and engaging in 
unchecked “empire building” not necessarily aligned with the public’s interest. Critics also 
argued that even if the state were focused on advancing the public’s interest, it simply 
lacked the capacity to manage and respond effectively to an increasingly complex, fast-
paced, interconnected, and multicultural world. In addition to a lack of accountability and 
ineffectiveness, scholars argued that the money raised by taxes to fund the state’s 
expansive regulatory apparatus sucked capital from businesses and individuals and the 
unpredictability of the regulatory process itself served as a disincentive to investment and 
productivity; thus, they advocated a return to classical liberal, laissez-faire, free markets. 
Furthermore, critics of state-sponsored social welfare programs (health care, education, 
social security, housing, employment, etc.) suggested that the safety net caused more harm 
than good because it led to perpetual reliance on the state by discouraging individuals from 
looking after themselves. See, e.g., FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY 
141–43 (1973); SUNSTEIN, supra note 185, at 74–100; IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, 
400 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 2 
deregulation, or government withdrawal from the economic sphere, and a return to 
regulatory governance modeled after classical liberal laissez-faire principles.189 
Others called for reforms to the regulatory system, one program at a time, to fix 
failures and make sure that state intervention indeed met its goal of advancing 
social welfare.190 Out of this debate emerged a third paradigm for regulatory 
governance: decentralized regulatory governance. This new theory of governance 
recalibrates the power dynamic between the state and private individuals and 
provides the best explanation for the rise in statutory mediation mandates. 
 
C.  A New Theory: Decentralized Regulatory Governance 
 
Decentralized governance, a third theory of regulatory governance, explains 
why states would use mediation mandates to transfer dispute resolution authority 
from public adjudicative institutions, like the courts, to private disputants. 
Decentralized governance theory appears to balance the liberal state’s values of 
liberty and autonomy with the interventionist state’s values of equity and social 
welfare.191 Under the paradigm of decentralized governance (which elsewhere has 
been called many things, including reflexive or responsive regulation,192 
                                                 
RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 159–61 (Donald 
R. Harris et al. eds., 1992). 
189 The “Chicago School” comprised the chief architects of “economic theory of 
regulation,” which presented economic arguments for deregulation and a return to classical 
liberal laissez-faire markets. One component of their argument, the “public choice theory,” 
argued that a regulated market economy is not appropriately competitive and transparent, 
operating instead to the benefit of government officials; thus, regulation does not give 
market actors, consumers and producers a real choice about how and whether to engage in 
market transactions. See Stigler, supra note 188, at 3; Richard A. Posner, Theories of 
Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 335, 339 (1974); Sam Peltzman et 
al., An Economic Theory of Regulation After a Decade of Deregulation, 
MICROECONOMICS, 1989, at 1, 53–56 (1989). 
190 See generally BREYER, supra note 186, at 341–68 (discussing approaches to 
regulatory reform). 
191 Whether the regulatory state is in retreat or whether it has shifted to a new, third 
paradigm is a topic of debate among scholars, further compounded by different 
governments’ reactions to the “Great Recession” of 2008. This Article does not attempt to 
resolve this debate (although the statistics from the Federal Register are certainly a 
persuasive argument that deregulation is not occurring, see C.F.R., supra note 186), but 
instead focus on the model of decentralized regulation in which the state shapes and 
manipulates while preserving individual choice. See Purvis, Regulation, Governance, and 
the State, supra note 184, at 37–43; see generally John W. Cioffi, After the Fall: 
Regulatory Lessons from the Global Financial Crisis, in HANDBOOK ON THE POLITICS OF 
REGULATION 642 (David Levi-Faur ed., 2011) (discussing regulation after the 2007–09 
financial crisis). 
192 AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 188, at 4–5 (asserting that government 
regulation should not completely displace the market; involving industry in regulation 
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procedural regulation,193 decentralized regulation,194 or libertarian paternalism195) 
the entity being regulated is considered to have valuable knowledge or decision-
making capacity that, in some instances, has greater legitimacy than the state’s 
knowledge base or decision-making capacity.  
Decentralized governance operates by replacing the paternalistic 
interventionism of the welfare state with procedures that allow for party autonomy, 
self-regulation, and greater participation in the regulatory process.196 Rather than 
issuing demands, the state uses law to transfer responsibility for crafting and 
implementing those demands to other systems within civil society, such as local 
communities, private-sector industries, trade associations, or professional 
organizations.197 “Laws, therefore, do not specify the substantive ends to be 
achieved but rather encourage the informational and governance capacities of 
organizations,” yet without abdicating the goal of regulating in the interests of the 
common good.198 Through procedures like deliberative democracy, a process for 
inclusive group decision making, regulated entities can inform regulation. In 
                                                 
allows for a more tailored response by government). See generally PHILIPPE NONET & 
PHILIP SELZNICK, LAW AND SOCIETY IN TRANSITION: TOWARD RESPONSIVE LAW 73–113 
(1978). 
193 Habermas, supra note 180, at 776–80 (identifying a third, proceduralist paradigm 
in law that is distinct from classical liberalism and the interventionist social welfare state in 
that administrative procedures exist to “steer” individuals while still allowing individual 
autonomy). 
194 See Julia Black, Critical Reflections on Regulation, 27 AUSTL. J. LEG. PHIL. 1, 2–
10 (2002). 
195 Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an 
Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159, 1161–62 (2003) [hereinafter Sunstein & Thaler, 
Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron] (considering libertarian paternalism as a 
means of influencing behavior while respecting free choice, or “self-conscious efforts, by 
private and public institutions, to steer people’s choices in directions that will improve the 
choosers’ own welfare”); RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING 
DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 83 (rev. and expanded ed., 2009) 
[hereinafter THALER & SUNSTEIN, NUDGE] (presenting a variety of examples and 
recommendations for “choice architecture,” structuring law and public policy using 
libertarian paternalism to improve health, schools, retirement saving, etc.). 
196 See Swan, Governing at a Distance, supra note 173, at 11–14 (“[R]ecent 
approaches emphasize a ‘decentring’ of a state that is but one of a plurality of sites of 
governance and regulation.”). 
197 See Alan Hunt, Legal Governance and Social Relations: Empowering Agents and 
the Limits of Law, in LAW, REGULATION, AND GOVERNANCE, supra note 173, at 55, 61; 
Swan, Governing at a Distance, supra note 173, at 8–9; Black, supra note 194, at 1, 15–20. 
Many use self-regulating professions like the legal profession as an example of 
decentralized regulation. See also Michel Foucault, The Subject and Power, in MICHEL 
FOUCAULT: BEYOND STRUCTURALISM AND HERMENEUTICS, 208–26 (Hubert L. Dreyfus & 
Paul Rabinow eds., 2d ed., 1982) (describing the relationship between individual choice 
and state control with theories of “responsibilization” and “governmentality”). 
198 Swan, Governing at a Distance, supra note 173, at 14. 
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theory, delegating regulatory tasks to non-state actors can allow regulation to 
become customized and responsive to the circumstances of different groups.199 
And, government can empower private entities to police one another. Consider, for 
example, delegating the state’s watchdog or enforcement powers to public interest 
groups, like the Sierra Club or National Wildlife Federation, by enacting a statute 
that gives them legal standing to bring a lawsuit against an environmental 
polluter.200 
It is important to note that while decentralized governance theory conceives of 
state regulation as procedural rather than interventionist, the social-equity 
objectives remain. Under this theory, the state should use law to empower 
individuals, powerful and marginalized alike, to take responsibility for, and 
improve, some aspect of their own condition, like health or employment.201 To 
create this shift in responsibility, state policymakers and deputized private entities 
employ legal and extralegal incentives, such as default rules for retirement savings, 
comparative negligence regimes, or reduced home insurance premiums for 
installing security systems.202 Individuals exercise choice and take responsibility 
for those choices, but do so in a closed universe, steered or “nudged” in directions 
that improve their own welfare.203 Thus, policymakers increasingly become 
“choice architects”204 and facilitators, overseeing legal regimes that create 
processes in which social and economic actors retain individual choice, but do so 
in furtherance of the public good.205 
The theory of decentralized governance provides a helpful model to explain 
the institutionalization of mediation and the multi-dimensional relationship 
                                                 
199 As the theory goes, delegating government intervention to private actors allows the 
government to harmonize its public-interest regulatory goals more closely with laissez-faire 
market efficiency. But this does not mean that industry gets to make up its own rules to the 
game and also be the referee. AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 188, at 158–62. 
200 Id. 
201 Sunstein & Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, supra note 195, 
at 1167–70 (2003) (indicating that people often make choices against their own self-
interest, not because they are exercising true preferences based on rational deliberation (as 
homo economicus might), but because of influences, both subtle and overt, that have been 
studied and demonstrated by behavioral economists). 
202 Hunt, supra note 197, at 63. 
203 See Sunstein & Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, supra note 
195, at 1162–63, 1196–1201. It is worth pointing out that Thaler and Sunstein, while 
arguing for individual autonomy and choice, do not suggest that individuals know what is 
best for themselves. Using findings from behavioral economics, Thaler and Sunstein 
demonstrate that individual decision makers are highly susceptible to suggestion and 
frequently make irrational decisions against their self-interest. Choice architecture exploits 
this human tendency by deliberately building choice intersections, or points at which 
someone can choose one fork in the road over another, to influence people to make a 
choice that does serve their best interests. Id. 
204 Id. at 1161. 
205 Hunt, supra note 197, at 68 (citation omitted). 
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between public and private power. Perhaps not coincidentally, the judicial reform 
movement that led to the institutionalization of mediation in American courts and 
administrative agencies206 occurred at the same time that the interventionist model 
of regulatory governance faced criticism in the 1970s. Just as judicial reform 
advocates sought to use ADR procedures like mediation to empower disputants 
and provide efficient access to justice, regulatory reforms redesigned regulatory 
procedure to reinsert autonomy and individual choice into the federal 
government’s regulatory apparatus. 
Thus, statutory mediation mandates should be viewed as decentralized 
governance, or state regulation that constructs procedural architecture to advance 
the general public’s welfare. Rather than state institutions maintaining a monopoly 
on dispute resolution through adjudication in judicial and administrative contexts, 
the state sends parties through a mediation process instead of prescribing an 
outcome. Laws requiring disputing parties to mediate exemplify the trend toward 
“‘proceduralism’; law is less directed to supply rules for decision than it is to 
introduce procedures through which substantive decisions may be reached.”207 
Disputing parties negotiate directly, assess the nature of the harm suffered and the 
responsibility owed, and ultimately develop their own resolution.208 The state 
requires parties to negotiate and allows them to retain a degree of choice and 
autonomy within the mediation process. Parties can still determine mediation 
outcomes: whether to agree or not to agree, and according to what terms. 
 
VI.  RECOMMENDATIONS FOR LEGISLATURES DESIGNING DECENTRALIZED 
DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
 
Using mediation as a decentralized regulatory vehicle is neither categorically 
“good” nor categorically “bad.” Rather, formalizing certain components of the 
mediation process can provide benefits or impose unfair burdens on parties. In 
some situations, requiring disputants to attempt private resolution through 
mediation provides a benefit by forcing early, direct communication in a 
moderated environment. Yet while a highly structured, rule-based mediation 
process can neutralize power imbalances for some parties, formalizing mediation 
can also create leverage that elevates one side’s negotiation power over the other. 
Thus, decisions about which elements of the mediation process to formalize should 
be made carefully.  
The following sections take a critical look at the effect of certain elements of 
mediation statutes on the parties themselves. It then proposes recommendations for 
how legislatures can design procedural architecture that maximizes the potential 
benefits of mediation and minimizes the potential harms. 
 
                                                 
206 See supra Part III.A. 
207 These echoes of Lon Fuller are found in Hunt, supra note 197, at 58. 
208 See supra Part II. 
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A.  How to Build Efficiency and Equity into the Process 
 
Relocating dispute resolution authority from state actors to private individuals 
has the potential to yield benefits for the disputing parties. Disputants who 
negotiate directly in mediation may resolve their differences with reduced costs, 
greater efficiency, and more tailored remedies than the state can provide—the very 
“production” and “quality” arguments that first fueled mediation’s 
institutionalization.209 The notion that parties can be empowered to resolve their 
differences on their own, without state intervention, is rhetorically compelling.   
However, rather than “surrendering conflict to existing power 
constellations,”210 legislators should design mediation architecture that promotes a 
fair process and, as a consequence, advances just outcomes. Individuals with 
limited economic, social, or cultural capital, who may be vulnerable in negotiations 
with “repeat players,”211 can benefit when legislatures include certain requirements 
in their statutory mandates. For example, as this section discusses, requiring 
mediation participants to have settlement authority, specifying what information to 
exchange, and prescribing topics for discussion can help parties reach more fully 
informed, consensus-based resolutions than they might otherwise. 
It may seem paradoxical that in order to ensure that an informal process like 
mediation does not compromise social justice (a concern also raised when 
mediation was first institutionalized),212 some parts of the mediation process must 
become formalized. Yet formalizing the mediation process will be necessary if 
states continue to embed mediation mandates into substantive law because states 
have an ethical responsibility to design dispute resolution processes that promote, 
rather than undermine, fairness.213 
 
1.  Require Settlement Authority 
 
A statute requiring parties with decision-making authority to attend mediation 
exemplifies the kind of libertarian paternalist choice architecture that promotes fair 
and efficient negotiations. The statute preserves parties’ liberty to choose whether 
and how to settle the dispute, a defining characteristic of classical mediation, but 
makes resolution possible by mandating settlement authority as a foundational 
legal requirement of parties in mediation. This requirement can prove particularly 
                                                 
209 See supra Part III.B. 
210 GUNTHER TEUBNER, Juridification—Concepts, Aspects, Limits, Solutions, in 
JURIDIFICATION OF SOCIAL SPHERES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS IN THE AREAS OF LABOR, 
CORPORATE, ANTITRUST, AND SOCIAL WELFARE LAW 3, 8 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1987). 
211 Galanter, supra note 134, at 97. 
212 See generally Grillo, supra note 88, at 1555–61; Delgado et al., supra note 88, at 
1361–67; Bryan, supra note 88, at 446–81. 
213 See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Are There Systemic Ethics Issues in Dispute System 
Design? And What We Should [Not] Do About It: Lessons from International and 
Domestic Fronts, 14 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 195, 211–19 (2009). 
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useful when one party is an individual and the other an organization, as is often the 
case for consumer and corporate disputes. 
 
2.  Establish Rules for Information Exchange 
 
Similarly, legislatures can effectuate informed and efficient negotiations by 
prescribing discussion topics and identifying what information to exchange prior to 
or during mediation. Parties can know in advance the agenda for the mediation and 
come prepared. It also can have the effect of correcting imbalances of power 
between the parties and forcing a party that has more information—or that may be 
unlikely to cooperate—to cover in depth all the topics the less informed or less 
empowered party wants to cover. Mandating information exchange and prescribing 
topics for discussion may protect a less experienced or sophisticated party, 
especially one without legal representation, and help make mediation discussions 
more informed without significantly burdening the other party. This requirement 
can also help to protect the mediator’s neutrality by assigning responsibility for 
producing information to the parties so that the mediator’s role does not become 
that of inquisitor. 
 
3.  Acknowledge Imbalances of Power and Make Informational Support Available 
 
Legislators cannot assume parties will be equally matched in mediation and 
therefore need to consider ways to empower weaker parties.214 It seems impossible 
to imagine how a statute could correct for every potential imbalance of power, 
which can be highly contextual and may include differences in language ability, 
legal knowledge, financial resources, time, and prior experience. However, if 
parties in mediation are expected to police each other in a reciprocal manner, all 
parties need to be able to advocate for their interests and understand the other 
party’s motivations.215 One recommendation is to give the less sophisticated party, 
for example a homeowner approaching foreclosure mediation with the investor 
representative, access to information or professional assistance before attending 
mediation.216 Some foreclosure mediation programs require parties to meet with a 
                                                 
214 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Do the “Haves” Come Out Ahead in Alternative Judicial 
Systems?: Repeat Players in ADR, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 19, 25–26 (1999) (“To 
put it simply, the “Haves” come out ahead by being able to choose and manipulate what 
process will be used to enforce substantive rights.”). While requiring mediation may 
remove powerful parties’ ability to choose a dispute process favorable to them, mediation 
may well be their process of choice. 
215 Lon Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 361–62 
(1978) (“[I]n a relation of reciprocity each party is expected to stand up for himself . . . 
however, we must know, if we are to obtain what we want, what the other fellow wants.”). 
216 Attorneys can be useful to parties negotiating “in the shadow of the law” by 
helping parties figure out their real interests, explaining applicable legal norms, and, if the 
case were to continue to litigation, probable outcomes. Yet, attorneys can also frustrate 
406 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 2 
housing counselor or attorney in a brief advice session prior to mediation.217 Other 
jurisdictions train and sponsor volunteer attorneys who can provide limited 
representation in mediation.218 
If, after considering potential power imbalances, legislatures cannot provide 
adequate support for vulnerable parties, then perhaps an altogether different 
dispute resolution process should be selected. Mediation is predicated on the 
theory that parties craft and choose their own settlement terms; if policymakers 
have concerns about those choices in situations where parties are unequally 
matched, then mediation may not be the right process choice. Other processes in 
which a third party analyzes parties’ legal rights and responsibilities, such as 
nonbinding arbitration or early neutral evaluation by an experienced attorney, 
would be a better fit. 
 
B.  How to Avoid Adverse Consequences of Formalization 
 
Despite the potential benefits of further institutionalizing mediation, there are 
potential risks both from embedding mandatory mediation into individual statutory 
regimes and formalizing certain aspects of the mediation process. Formalizing 
mediation with legal mandates adds procedural complexity to dispute resolution—
complexity that can sometimes burden the parties and frustrate the state’s effort to 
help parties become more actively engaged in resolving their disputes. Some 
legislatures’ statutory directives may generate confusion about the mediation 
process, spur new and unintended causes of action, or serve as barriers for injured 
parties seeking redress.  
Further, for these statutes, as forms of decentralized governance, to effectuate 
their intended social benefit, parties must be incentivized to participate and also be 
able to police each other. Yet legislatures have used mediation to regulate disputes, 
particularly those between businesses and individual consumers, where parties are 
                                                 
private negotiations by relying too heavily on legal rules and precedents. Robert H. 
Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of 
Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 985–88 (1979). 
217 See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 61.24.031, .160, .163 (West 2004 & Supp. 2015) 
(requiring the foreclosing party to contact homeowners; provide information about housing 
counselors, attorneys, and mediation; and inform the homeowner that failure to meet with a 
housing counselor to discuss alternatives to foreclosure may forfeit the opportunity to 
mediate). 
218 See, e.g., Foreclosure Prevention Pro Bono Project, PRO BONO RESOURCE 
CENTER OF MARYLAND, http://probonomd.org/about-us/about-foreclosure-prevention 
[https://perma.cc/J6LW-W8GM] (last visited Jan. 19, 2016) (providing free training, 
malpractice insurance, and mentoring support for attorneys who volunteer to provide 
limited representation to homeowners in foreclosure). This approach would require 
adjustments to the jurisdiction’s Rules of Professional Conduct to enable attorneys to 
provide assistance in a limited capacity without fear of client conflicts. See MODEL RULES 
OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 6.5 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013). 
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not evenly matched in sophistication or negotiation power and therefore cannot 
effectively police each other. Legislatures must keep consumer protection in mind 
when considering a decentralized, procedural regulation like mediation and may 
find that for disputes of particular concern to the public, a more interventionist 
approach to regulation may prove a better policy choice. 
 
1.  Aim for Procedural Uniformity and Predictability 
 
Proliferating statutes containing bespoke mediation procedure can create 
problems if it becomes too difficult for parties to know what to expect of the 
mediation process and, in turn, what is expected of them.219 When legislatures 
construct different dispute resolution procedures that are all called “mediation,” 
each with particularized legal rights and responsibilities based on the type of 
dispute, legislators do a disservice if the public (and the legal community) does not 
know what to expect from a legally mandated dispute resolution process. For 
example, in some statutes, the mediator may be required to assess parties’ good-
faith participation, issue sanctions if certain documents are not provided, or make 
decisions about how unresolved issues should be settled, while other statutes 
prohibit such behavior from the mediator. If legislators seek to impose some 
element of consistency, one approach is adopting the Uniform Mediation Act 
(“UMA”) and having it govern all statutory mediation requirements, as Illinois 
does.220 Indeed, one of the motivations for developing the UMA was to promote 
uniformity and consistency of mediation practice throughout a single 
jurisdiction.221 Or a state could develop its own mediation statute to establish what 
the mediator’s role and conduct will be and what parties can expect with respect to 
confidentiality.222 
                                                 
219 This concern echoes the calls for transsubstantive procedure, or a procedure that is 
uniform across case types, which propelled the writing and passage of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure. Whether uniformity has served the interests of civil justice remains a 
contested issue, eight decades later. Subrin, The Limitations of Transsubstantive 
Procedures, supra note 97, at 391 (“Since . . . procedural decisions can, and often do, 
materially influence substantive application, the rules cannot provide a uniformity of 
result.”); Thomas O. Main, The Procedural Foundation of Substantive Law, 87 WASH. U. 
L. REV. 801, 840 (2010) (“[E]fforts to harmonize or approximate procedural 
systems . . . are championed with promises of efficiency, simplicity, and uniformity.”). 
220 See 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 605/32 (West 2009 & Supp. 2015) (requiring all 
mediations under this section to be governed by the Uniform Mediation Act). 
221 See Prefatory Note to the UNIF. MEDIATION ACT, supra note 12 (discussing the 
guiding principles behind the UMA). To date, the UMA has been adopted in eleven states 
(Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Nebraska, New Jersey, Ohio, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, 
and Washington) and the District of Columbia. Legislative Fact Sheet — Mediation Act, 
UNIF. L. COMMISSION, http://www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title= 
Mediation%20Act [https://perma.cc/4YWC-BV9D] (last visited Mar. 22, 2016). 
222 See, e.g., Mediation Confidentiality Act, MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-
1801(b), (d)(1)–(2) (LexisNexis 2013) (defining “mediation” as a process of working with 
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Then again, there may be perfectly good reasons to vary construction of 
mediation processes if those adaptations make the process better suited for a type 
of dispute or set of disputants. Ideally, legislatures are aware of these different 
variations and make informed decisions about which architectural design choices 
to make, for example to improve communication rather than spread confusion. It 
may be unrealistic, however, for legislators to have expertise in both the 
substantive nature of a dispute as well as the technicalities of mediation procedural 
design. Some states have therefore established stand-alone mediation and dispute 
resolution agencies that provide mediation expertise to the state. These agencies 
are charged with promulgating rules for mediating specific disputes and providing 
a range of subject-specific mediation services.223 
 
2.  Avoid Creating New Causes of Action, Especially When Parties’ Negotiation 
Power Is Likely Mismatched  
 
One important consequence of a decentralized, procedural approach to 
regulation is that, ironically, more procedure leads to more, rather than less, law by 
spawning new legal rights and responsibilities.224 What once were informal 
processes, like negotiation, now become more formalized and solidified in law. 
Formalizing mediation with new substantive legal obligations, such as 
requirements for informal pleading,225 good-faith participation,226 and prescribed 
topics for mediation discussions,227 also means potential new causes of action if 
                                                 
impartial mediators to reach a voluntary agreement and “mediator” as a person who 
“[a]ssists parties in reaching their own voluntary agreement” and who adheres to the 
Maryland Standard of Conduct for Mediators). Maryland does not achieve complete, 
statewide consistency because the statute does carve out a variety of exceptions for certain 
types of mediations, such as foreclosure and some court-connected mediation programs. 
See id. § 3-1802(b). 
223 See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 3600 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.) 
(establishing the California State Mediation and Conciliation Service); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 
34:13A-4 (West 2011) (establishing the State Board of Mediation in the Department of 
Labor). 
224 This phenomenon is also called “juridification.” See generally Teubner, supra note 
210. A second consequence is the blurring of lines between public and private spheres—
state compelled mediation occupies both of these. Purvis, Regulation, Governance, and the 
State, supra note 184, at 42; see also Hunt, supra note 197, at 58 (“[M]any organizations 
replace informal means of dispute resolution by formalized law-like systems of rules and 
procedures.”). 
225 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 400.0233 (2) (West 2012) (requiring mediation before 
a resident of a nursing home can file suit for negligence); discussion supra Part IV.B.5. 
226 See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1958-B(1) (West 2005) (requiring dispute 
resolution in agricultural marketing and bargaining); discussion supra Part IV.B.3. 
227 See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 4633 (West, Westlaw through 2015–2016 First 
Sess.) (requiring mediation in foreclosure proceedings); discussion supra Part IV.B.4. 
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those obligations go unmet. A number of consequences flow from hyperlegalizing 
mediation, and legislators should proceed with caution. 
First, by creating new causes of action and making litigation more complex, 
legislators may inadvertently frustrate their efforts to relocate dispute resolution 
within civil society. If one reason for legislatures’ decision to embed mediation 
requirements into statutes is to reduce state involvement in dispute resolution and 
to make dispute processing more accessible, codifying the mediation process 
frustrates that goal by creating two, three, sometimes four additional issues, 
unrelated to the original substantive claim, for parties to fight about in court.228 
Consequently, not only are causes of action multiplied by formalizing mediated 
negotiations, any subsequent litigation is also rendered more complex. This has 
additional significance if only one of the parties has financial resources or capacity 
to sustain prolonged, complex court litigation after failed negotiations. Thus, 
inserting legal requirements into the mediation process can increase, rather than 
decrease, the time and money ultimately spent litigating in the courts and may give 
powerful parties an unfair advantage. 
Second, while new causes of action created by formalizing mediation 
exemplify decentralized regulatory governance because they deputize private 
parties to police each other, problems arise when the parties are unequally 
matched. Some mediation statutes deliberately create causes of action to encourage 
cooperative negotiation behavior and deter uncooperative negotiation behavior. 
For example, if a party fails to produce the required documents listed in the statute, 
the other party can, theoretically, turn to the courts to report the bad behavior and 
seek a remedy like enforcement of the document production or sanctions.229 In 
theory, knowing that the well-behaved party has this power should incentivize 
good behavior from a potential misbehaver. Behavioral checks-and-balances can 
work if the parties are equally matched in financial capacity and legal 
sophistication. But in reality that is not always the case. Inserting a cause of action 
into a mediation between unequal parties, for example a large business and an 
individual, non-corporate consumer, can doubly work against the less powerful 
party—the less powerful party will not be able to provide an adequate check on the 
more powerful party and, knowing its behavior goes unchecked, the more powerful 
party may be more inclined to misbehave. 
This is especially true when legislators build in a good-faith requirement to a 
statutory mediation process. It may seem more expedient to establish a legal 
requirement for good-faith participation in mediation, enabling parties to police 
                                                 
228 Others have discussed this phenomenon, called “satellite litigation,” in relation to 
good-faith requirements. See Lande, Good Faith Requirement, supra note 142, at 8–9 n.10. 
229 See, e.g., Leyva v. Nat’l Default Servicing Corp., 255 P.3d 1275, 1281 (Nev. 
2011); Pasillas v. HSBC Bank USA, 255 P.3d 1281, 1287 (Nev. 2011). It is important to 
note that in these cases, the mediator, and not the other party, was required to report 
failures to comply with mediation statutory requirements. See Levya, 255 P.3d at 1277; 
Pasillas, 255 P.3d at 1284. 
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each other on the front end of dispute processing, rather than for the government to 
intervene downstream to determine whether parties took their duty to negotiate 
seriously. Yet, the good-faith requirement inserts a wildcard into the parties 
bargaining relationship. One party can threaten to file a bad faith claim against an 
opposing party if that party refuses to agree to certain terms. Thus, good-faith 
requirements can become a potential weapon to be exploited by the more ruthless 
negotiating party against the other.230 And, as discussed above, empowering the 
mediator to act as a check against party misbehavior not only tampers with the 
mediator’s neutral role, but also undermines confidentiality.231 
Thus, when constructing statutory mediation procedures, legislatures need to 
be aware when they are creating new causes of action. Sometimes inserting causes 
of action promotes decentralized regulation and effectuates high quality 
negotiations. But, disputes with inherently mismatched parties may require more 
direct state intervention than a formalized mediation procedure since it cannot be 
assumed the parties will regulate each other in mediation. 
 
3.  Avoid Obstructing Access to Justice 
 
Another important issue for legislators to understand is that formalizing the 
mediation process can make mediation harder, not easier, to access. For example, 
although requirements to exchange information and documentation can lead to 
more informed and efficient negotiations, they can also serve as a disincentive to 
people who have suffered a harm from seeking redress. A person with a complaint 
against a nursing home in Florida must, by statute, first document the harm and 
then obtain an attorney’s imprimatur that valid grounds exist for legal action before 
she can proceed to mediation, a statutory prerequisite to filing a claim in court.232 It 
is not difficult to imagine how potential plaintiffs lacking the time, financial 
resources, and emotional energy to complete each of these steps may be 
discouraged from stepping forward. As others have noted, “one person’s 
discouraged plaintiff is another’s quashed nuisance lawsuit,”233 suggesting that 
procedural roadblocks like mandatory mediation may prevent lawsuits that lack 
legal merit from reaching court yet also discourage individuals with valid claims 
from coming forward. When creating mediation procedure, legislatures must 
consider whether one party will bear a heavier burden than the other to reach the 
negotiation table. 
                                                 
230 Lande, Good Faith Requirement, supra note 142, at 9. 
231 See supra note 142 and accompanying text. 
232 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 400.0233(2) (West 2012). 
233 Joseph W. Doherty et al., Introduction to CONFIDENTIALITY, TRANSPARENCY, AND 
THE U.S. CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM xiii, xviii (Joseph W. Doherty et al. eds., 2012). 
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4.  Decouple Mediation Process from Policy Outcomes 
 
Policymakers must further recognize that a statutory mediation mandate does 
not guarantee particular policy outcomes and that sometimes more interventionist 
regulation will be necessary, particularly for business-consumer disputes about 
which the public may have particular concern. Indeed, if policymakers attempt to 
protect consumers by formalizing their negotiations with more powerful business 
interests, as discussed above, then those powerful players may be unwilling to 
negotiate. As David Luban notes, if the outcomes of mediated negotiations differ 
significantly from the outcomes of unmediated negotiations, then powerful players 
have little incentive to participate234 and consumer protection goals remain 
unattained.   
This prediction played out in Hawaii’s mandatory dispute resolution program 
for nonjudicial, contractual foreclosures. In an effort to protect homeowners, 
policymakers passed a law mandating foreclosure mediation as a way to interrupt 
automated foreclosure practices that often resulted in mistakes or improper denials 
of loan modification requests.235 The loan servicers found the statutory dispute 
resolution process so overly legalistic and cumbersome that they chose to pursue 
foreclosure through the courts, rather than participate.236 Some in the loan 
servicing industry, particularly in those jurisdictions where mediation could not be 
bypassed, complained that requiring negotiations with homeowners in foreclosure 
mediation added costs, gave homeowners an opportunity to remain in their homes 
longer without making mortgage payments, and wasted time by delaying the 
inevitable. From the lender’s point of view, there was nothing to negotiate: a loan 
was in default, the home was collateral on the loan, and the remedy under the law 
was for the lender to foreclose and recoup the value of the loan.237  
                                                 
234 Luban, supra note 14, at 396–98. 
235 Nussbaum, supra note 98, at 1918; see supra note 98 and accompanying text. 
236 Loan servicers’ refusal to participate in nonjudicial foreclosure mediation occurred 
in Hawaii and also in Oregon. Andrew Gomes, Foreclosure Bill Aims to Increase 
Mediation, HONOLULU STAR ADVERTISER (Feb. 6 2013, 1:30 AM), 
http://www.staradvertiser.com/business/foreclosure-bill-aims-to-increase-mediation 
[https://perma.cc/YHU2-4V7Q]; Elon Glucklich, Some Lenders Sidestep Oregon’s 
Foreclosure Mediation, THE BULLETIN (Bend, Or.) (Dec. 9 2013, 12:01 AM), 
http://www.bendbulletin.com/home/1372327-151/some-lenders-sidestep-oregons-fore 
closure-mediation [https://perma.cc/6MBC-F793]. 
237 See, e.g., Peter Goonan, Massachusetts Bankers Association Raises Objections to 
Springfield Anti-Foreclosure Ordinances, Raising Legal Issues, MASSLIVE (Sept. 26, 2011, 
4:30 PM), http://www.masslive.com/news/index.ssf/2011/09/massachusetts_bankers_ 
associat.html [https://perma.cc/4URD-MAXD]; Jim Gallagher, Foreclosure Mediation 
Angers Bankers, Pleases Housing Advocates, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Aug. 26, 2012, 
12:15 AM), http://www.stltoday.com/business/columns/jim-gallagher/foreclosure-
mediation-angers-bankers-pleases-housing-advocates/article_92970e80-e8bc-11e1-8a25-
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Ultimately, decentralized governance alone was not enough to address the 
lender and loan servicer behavior that contributed to the foreclosure crisis; a more 
interventionist governance approach was also needed. Indeed, the federal 
government created the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau in 2010 with 
passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, a 
new federal agency tasked with supervising companies, restricting unfair or 
abusive practices, and enforcing federal consumer financial protection laws.238 And 
in 2012, the state attorneys general from forty-nine states,239 the District of 
Columbia, and the U.S. Department of Justice together sued the largest loan 
servicers for improper business practices leading up to, and during, the residential 
mortgage foreclosure crisis.240 Thus, policymakers need to be aware that, while it 
may appear more politically expedient to require parties to mediate and then shape 
their behavior within the context of mediation, direct government intervention may 
be required to achieve the intended policy outcome. 
Finally, making decisions about policy reform requires access to information, 
but the mediation process can obscure information with its confidentiality 
                                                 
0019bb30f31a.html [https://perma.cc/83DC-YHJG]. Indeed, Florida’s statewide 
foreclosure mediation program failed because of resistance by lender representatives to 
comply with the program. Kim Miller, Panel: Kill Foreclosure Mediation, PALM BEACH 
POST (Oct. 21, 2011, 8:00 PM), http://www.palmbeachpost.com/news/news/real-
estate/panel-kill-foreclosure-mediation/nLy5S [https://perma.cc/9DQZ-XDWR]; Kim 
Miller, S. Florida Judges Brace for a Possible Fallout of the Foreclosure Mediation 
Program, PALM BEACH POST (Oct. 25, 2011, 6:44 PM), 
http://www.palmbeachpost.com/news/news/real-estate/s-florida-judges-brace-for-a-
possible-fallout-of-t/nLy99 [https://perma.cc/35ZD-ZPR5]. However, not all jurisdictions 
faced resistance from bankers associations. See, e.g., John L. Olsen, Residential 
Foreclosure Mediation: The Delaware Model, DELAWARE BANKER (Del. Bankers Ass’n) 
Fall 2009, at 10, 12. 
238 Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5301, 5511 
(2010); About Us, CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU (Jan. 11, 2016), 
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/the-bureau [https://perma.cc/Y3RP-LUTR].  
239 The only state not to join the litigation was Oklahoma. 
240 The allegations brought against defendant mortgage servicers included misconduct 
leading to “issuance of improper mortgages, premature and unauthorized foreclosures, 
violation of service members’ and other homeowners’ rights and protection, the use of false 
and deceptive affidavits and other documents, and the waste and abuse of taxpayer funds.” 
Complaint at 8–9, United States v. Bank of Am. Corp., 753 F.3d 1335 (D.D.C. 2014) (No. 
13-5112). Ultimately, the Attorney General settled with five of the largest loan servicers, 
Ally/GMAC, Bank of America, Citi, JP Morgan Chase, and Wells Fargo, for $50 billion. 
About the Settlement, JOINT STATE-FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE SERVICING 
SETTLEMENTS, http://www.nationalmortgagesettlement.com/about [https://perma.cc/PYV5-
BE9Y] (last visited Mar. 26, 2016); Justice Department, Federal and State Partners Secure 
Record $13 Billion Global Settlement with JPMorgan for Misleading Investors About 
Securities Containing Toxic Mortgages, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Nov. 19, 2013), 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-federal-and-state-partners-secure-record-
13-billion-global-settlement [https://perma.cc/65T3-MDYP]. 
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protections and individualized approach to dispute resolution. Therefore, 
legislatures should spend time considering whether “nudging” more disputes to 
resolve out of the public eye, erodes transparency and undermines the state’s 
interest in protecting consumers. Will families be able to assess the safety practices 
of an adult care home if previous complaints were resolved in confidential 
mediation sessions? How can consumer advocates identify patterns of misconduct 
by loan servicers or telecommunications carriers if individual claims are resolved 
quietly, one at a time? Whether the state should relinquish its power over dispute 
resolution outcomes, and whether parties, often unequally matched, can actually 
regulate each other in settlement negotiations, are questions hotly debated by 
scholars.241 Policymakers should be thoughtful about what kinds of disputes may 
have significance to the public. Some existing proposals for preserving public 
information while encouraging settlement include requiring parties to report the 
outcome of settlements negotiated in mediation in a national database242 or for the 
parties themselves to make mediated settlement terms publically available.243  
As this discussion demonstrates, statutory mediation mandates are not neutral 
because they create procedures that have substantive regulatory effects. Even 
though parties must agree to any outcomes of mediation, the way in which the 
process is structured influences parties’ negotiation leverage. Consequently, the 
                                                 
241 Laurie Kratky Doré, Public Courts Versus Private Justice: It’s Time to Let Some 
Sun Shine in on Alternative Dispute Resolution, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 463, 468 (2006); 
Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085–90 (1984); David Luban, 
Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619, 2642–47 (1995); Marc 
Galanter, Worlds of Deals: Using Negotiation to Teach About Legal Process, 34 J. LEGAL 
EDUC. 268, 268–69 (1984); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?: A 
Philosophical and Democratic Defense of Settlement (In Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663, 
2667–71 (1995); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, For and Against Settlement: Uses and Abuses of 
the Mandatory Settlement Conference, 33 UCLA L. REV. 485, 498–506 (1985). Menkel-
Meadow coined the term “jurisprudes” to refer to those who are critical of mediation and 
negotiation because they appear to compromise legal rights and obligations. Carrie 
Menkel-Meadow, From Legal Disputes to Conflict Resolution and Human Problem 
Solving: Legal Dispute Resolution in a Multidisciplinary Context, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 7, 9, 
20 (2004). 
242 Stephen Yeazell, Transparency for Civil Settlements: NASDAQ for Lawsuits?, in 
CONFIDENTIALITY, TRANSPARENCY, AND THE U.S. CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 233, 
at 143, 153–57 (the lack of information about civil claim settlements in the United States 
makes it difficult for plaintiffs and defendants to obtain accurate “pricing” information for 
claims, but this problem could be mitigated if basic information about settlements were 
reported in a national database). 
243 Tom Baker, Transparency Through Insurance: Mandates Dominate Discretion, in 
CONFIDENTIALITY, TRANSPARENCY, AND THE U.S. CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 233, 
at 184, 185–86 (one way to increase transparency about the civil justice system is to 
expand mandatory claim-level reporting by liability insurers covering automobile 
accidents, medical injuries, products injuries, occupational injuries and worker 
compensation). 
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design of, and infrastructure surrounding, the mediation process can bolster or 
diminish the quality of mediated negotiations and their subsequent outcomes. It is 
the work of governments to determine what to regulate and how to regulate, and 
dispute resolution is no exception. Therefore, legislatures seeking to shift authority 
for dispute resolution from the state to private parties have important decisions to 
make about how to formalize dispute resolution procedures that advance public 
values of efficiency, equity, and fairness. 
 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
 
Mediation became a popular dispute resolution process in the United States 
beginning with the judicial reform movement of the late 1970s. In the intervening 
years, mediation has become “institutionalized” and an established component of 
dispute resolution procedure in courts and administrative agencies. Today, with 
greater frequency than ever before, legislatures deploy mediation as a means of 
regulating how private parties resolve their disputes. These statutes exemplify 
decentralized governance: disputing parties resolve their conflicts without state 
adjudication yet within procedural parameters laid down by the state, shifting 
responsibility for resolving disputes from the state to the parties themselves. 
State legislatures deploy mediation in two primary ways. First, they make 
mediation mandatory for parties seeking to assert or defend specific statutory 
rights. Through these mandates, legislatures expand the state’s reach, catching 
parties early in the conflict, sometimes before they have submitted their dispute to 
a court or an administrative agency. Second, legislatures not only require 
mediation, but also include additional legal requirements. In so doing, legislatures 
directly or indirectly influence the resolution of the dispute by removing party 
discretion, incentivizing settlement, or changing parties’ negotiation leverage. 
Legislators, in an effort to make private parties responsible for dispute 
resolution, need to be careful about which aspects of the mediation process they 
formalize. They cannot always assume that, when it comes to redressing certain 
kinds of harms, private disputants are adequately positioned—and capable—to 
work together to resolve their disputes and reach fair outcomes. In some ways, 
formalizing parts of the mediation process adds structure that can help parties 
engage in more informed and efficient negotiations. Yet in other ways, these 
statutory dispute resolution regimes add complexity to the dispute resolution 
process and depend on the parties’ ability to police each other. This complexity can 
burden parties and frustrate the state’s effort to make them more actively engaged 
in resolving their disputes. 
Ultimately, by enacting these mandatory mediation statutes, it appears 
legislators have generated a paradox. These statutes anchor dispute resolution 
within civil society, encouraging parties to negotiate directly and empowering 
them to take responsibility for resolving conflicts without state intervention. Yet in 
order to ensure fairness and balance disparate negotiating power or, perhaps more 
cynically, to increase the likelihood that parties actually settle disputes without 
using state resources, legislatures have transformed an informal process like 
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mediation into a formal, regulatory tool. Legislatures should approach statutory 
mediation mandates like any other form of regulation and take care to engineer 
dispute resolution processes that promote, rather than impede, social welfare and 
access to justice. 
